Advanced Design, Fabrication, and Testing
April 1965
1965
April 1
Grumman presented to MSC its recommendations for an all-battery
electrical power system for the LEM:
- Two batteries in the ascent stage
- Four batteries in the descent stage
- A new power distribution system
- Active cooling for the descent batteries and electrical control
assemblies
Following a review of cost and resources proposals, MSC
approved Grumman's configuration, and on April 15 gave the LEM manufacturer a
go-ahead.
MSC requested that Grumman evaluate the possibility of furnishing power for
the pre-separation checkout of the LEM wholly from that module's power supply.
This procedure would obviate the CSM's supplying that power during the initial
60 min of the checkout. This would simplify the electrical connections between
the two spacecraft and eliminate the possible requirement for an additional
battery charger in the CSM. The Center advised North American, however, that
such a charger might still be needed on Block II CSMs.
GAEC, "Implementation of LEM All-Battery Configuration," April 1, 1965;
letter, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, "Contract NAS
9-1100, Implementation of All-Battery LEM Configuration," April 15, 1965.
April 1
The first stage of the Saturn IB booster (the S-IB-1) underwent
its first static firing at Huntsville, Alabama. The stage's eight uprated H-1
engines produced about 71,168-kilonewtons (1.6 million lbs) thrust. On April 23,
Marshall and Rocketdyne announced that the uprated H-1 had passed qualification
testing and was ready for flight.
Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1965, p. 162; Space Business
Daily, April 7, 1965, p. 209.
April 1
Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips told ASPO Manager
Joseph F. Shea that Bellcomm, Inc., was conducting a systems engineering study
of lunar landing dynamics to determine "functional compatibility of the
navigation, guidance, control, crew, and landing gear systems involved in Apollo
lunar landing." Phillips asked that he be advised of any specific assignments in
these areas which would prove useful in support of the ASPO operation.
Shea replied, "We are currently evaluating the LEM lunar landing system with
the Apollo contractors and the NASA Centers. We believe that the landing problem
is being covered adequately by ourselves and these contractors." Shea added that
a meeting would be held at Grumman April 21 and 22 to determine if there were
any deficiencies in the program, and that he would be pleased to have Bellcomm
attend the meeting and later make comments and recommendations.
Letter, Phillips to Shea, April 1, 1965; letter, Shea to Phillips, April 6,
1965.
April 1-7
H. I. Thompson Company's first combustion chamber with a
tape-wrapped throat successfully withstood a series of four test firings. If
further testing confirmed its performance, reported the resident Apollo office
at Bethpage, N.Y., the design would be used in the LEM's ascent engine. (It
would replace the current compression-molded throat, which suffered from
excessive cracking.)
MSC, "Weekly Activity Report for Office of the Associate Administrator,
Manned Space Flight, April 4-10, 1965," p. 2.
April 1-8
The thrust mount for the LEM ascent engine cracked during
vibration testing. The mount would be strengthened.
During the same period, Bell tested the first one-piece ablative chamber for
the ascent engine (designed to replace the molded-throat design, which developed
cracks during testing . In firings that totaled over eight minutes, Bell
engineers found that the unit suffered only negligible throat erosion and decay
of chamber pressure.
"ASPO Weekly Management Report, April 1-8, 1965."
April 1-8
The cryoformed steel bottle for the portable life support
system, manufactured by Arde-Portland, Inc., passed its first burst and cycling
tests, which Crew Systems Division called a "major milestone" in its
development.
Ibid.
April 1-8
MSC and Grumman reviewed the requirement for a backup mode of
entering and leaving the LEM while on the moon. The new rectangular hatch was
deemed "inherently highly reliable," and the only failure that was even
"remotely possible" was one of the hatch mechanism. The proposal to use the top
(or transfer) hatch was impractical, because it would cost 13.6 kg (30 lb) and
would impose an undue hazard on both the crew and the spacecraft's thermal
shield.
Ibid.
April 1-8
North American reviewed nondestructive techniques for testing
honeycomb structures. The principal method involved ultrasonic testing, but this
approach was highly dependent upon equipment and procedure. At best, ultrasonic
testing could do no more than indicate faulty bond areas, and these could be
confirmed only through destructive tests. A number of promising nondestructive
methods were being investigated, but thus far none was satisfactory. The danger
in this situation was that, if design allowables had to be lowered to meet the
results of strength distribution tests, the weight advantage of honeycomb
construction might be lost.
"ASPO Weekly Management Report, April 1-8, 1965"; memorandum, D. D. Few,
RASPO-Downey, to R. H. Ridnour, "Recent Bonding Problems at NAA," May 12, 1965,
with enclosures.
April 2
North American presented final results of their modification to
the electrical power system for spacecraft 011 to solve the power and energy
problem. This consisted of the addition of three batteries which would be
mounted on the center platform and used to supply instrumentation and mission
control programmer loads during flight. These batteries would be paralleled with
the entry and landing batteries at impact to provide power for postlanding
recovery loads. MSC concurred with this approach.
Memorandum, Owen E. Maynard, MSC, to Chief, Instrumentation and Electronic
Systems Division, "S/C 011 circuit protection," April 8, 1965; TWX, C. L.
Taylor, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Systems Div., Attn: J. C. Cozad,
April 13, 1965.
April 2
Following a presentation by North American on the status of the
adapter, MSC spelled out specific and detailed design changes required.
Letter, J. B. Alldredge, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Systems Div.,
Attn: J. C. Cozad, "Contract NAS 9-150, Spacecraft LEM Adapter (SLA) change
status," April 2, 1965, with enclosure, "Technical Description of Proposed SLA
Changes."
April 5-11
Rocketdyne completed qualification tests on two CM reaction
control engines. These were successful. One of the nozzle extensions failed to
seat, however, and was rejected. Its failure was being analyzed.
NAA, "Project Apollo Spacecraft Test Program Weekly Activity Report (Period 5
April 1965 through 11 April 1965)," p. 3.
April 5-16
To evaluate the Block 11 CSM's manual thrust vector control,
five pilots, among them two astronauts, flew the Apollo simulator at Honeywell.
These mock flights demonstrated that the manual control was sufficiently
accurate for transearth injection. Also, researchers determined that the optical
alignment sight provided the crewmen with attitude references adequate for
midcourse maneuvers.
NAA, "Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-37, June 1, 1965, p. 6.
April 6
Quality verification vibration tests were completed on the
command module of spacecraft 006.
Ibid., p. 1; memorandum, W. D. Graves, MSC, to Distr., "Quality
Vibration Verification Testing (QVVT) Facility Validation," April 27, 1965.
April 7
A LEM/CSM interface meeting uncovered a number of design
problems and referred them to the Systems Engineering Division (SED) for
evaluation: the requirement for ground verification of panel deployment prior to
LEM withdrawal; the requirement for panel deployment in earth orbit during the
SA-206 flight; the absence of a backup to the command sequencer for jettisoning
the CSM (Flight Projects Division [FPD] urged such a backup signal); and
Grumman's opposition to a communications link with the LEM during withdrawal of
the spacecraft (FPD felt that such a link was needed through verification of
reaction control system ignition). SED's recommendations on these issues were
anticipated by April 22.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, April 8-15, 1965"; memorandum, R. W.
Lanzkron, MSC, to Chief, Systems Engineering Division, "LEM-1 CSM Interface
Meeting," April 19, 1965; memorandum, Lanzkron to Chief, Systems Engineering
Division, "LEM-1 CSM Interface Meeting," April 15, 1965.
April 8
Goddard Space Flight Center awarded a $4.6 million contract to
RCA for a deep space tracking and data acquisition system. The equipment, to be
installed on Cooper's Island, Bermuda, would support a variety of NASA space
missions, including Apollo flights.
Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1965, pp. 174-l75; Space
Business Daily, April 12, 1965, p. 231.
April 8-15
The MSC Crew Performance Section evaluated the ability of two
pressure-suited astronauts to put on and take off their external thermal
garments and portable life support systems (PLSS). The subjects had considerable
difficulty positioning the PLSS; also, though these modified thermal garments
were much easier to don and doff, the subjects still experienced some trouble
inserting the second arm.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, April 8-15, 1965."
April 8-15
Bell Aerosystems tested a pressure transducer for the LEM's
ascent propulsion system (the first time such a device was ever used with
hypergolic fuels). The transducer proved extremely accurate at sensing pressure
differences between the propellant lines.
Ibid.; "Monthly Progress Report No. 27," LPR-10-43, p. 13.
April 9
George E. Mueller, Associate Administrator for Manned Space
Flight, announced the transfer of control over manned space flights from Cape
Kennedy, Fla., to Houston, Texas. MSC's Mission Control Center would direct the
flights from end of liftoff through recovery.
NASA News Release 65-119, "Mission Control Center at Houston to Handle GT-4,
Subsequent Manned Flights," April 9, 1965.
April 9
Crew Systems Division (CSD) decided on a single garment for both
thermal and micrometeoroid protection for Apollo astronauts. CSD's Richard S.
Johnston summarized factors underlying this decision:
- The integrated garment would be easier to don and thus would simplify
preparations for leaving the LEM; it would fit better and afford greater
visibility, mobility, and access to suit controls.
- The dual-purpose garment would weigh about 2.3 kg (5 lbs) less than would
two separate protective covers. And because it would consume less storage
space, the ascent stage of the spacecraft could be lightened by about three
pounds. Involved here, also, was the abort weight of the LEM. It was assumed
that the most adverse conditions would be encountered during an "immediate
abort," before the crew could depressurize the cabin or jettison
now-superfluous equipment (such as the thermal/meteoroid garment).
- Conversely, separate protective garments - and the "staging" procedure
they entailed - would require modifications to the spacecraft and would
shorten the astronauts' stay outside the LEM. Moreover, and perhaps even more
important, separate garments would limit rescue possibilities and would lessen
crew safety.
Johnston emphasized that, if for any reason the
integration scheme proved impracticable, the division could still return to the
concept of separate thermal and micrometeoroid garments.
Memorandum, Richard S. Johnston, MSC, to Chief, Systems Engineering Division,
"Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) thermal and meteoroid protection," April 9,
1965.
April 9
Systems Engineering Division (SED) reviewed the Flight
Operations Directorate's recommendation for an up-data system in the LEM during
manned missions. (Currently the LEM's guidance computer received data either
from the computer in the CSM or from MSC.) SED concluded that, because the
equipment was not essential for mission success, an up-data system did not
warrant the cost and weight penalties ($750,000 and 4.54 kg [10 lbs]) that it
would entail.
Memorandum, Owen E. Maynard, MSC, to Manager, ASPO, "LEM up-data system,"
April 9, 1965.
April 12
The Apollo Program Director, Samuel C. Phillips, informed the
Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, George E. Mueller, that action
was underway by Grumman to terminate all Pratt & Whitney LEM fuel cell
activity by June 30, 1965. Pratt & Whitney would complete testing of LEM
fuel cell hardware already produced and one complete LEM fuel cell module plus
spare parts would be sent to MSC for in- house testing.
North American's Space and Information Systems Division would continue
development at Pratt & Whitney on the CSM fuel cell for 18 months at a cost
not to exceed $2.5 million, to ensure meeting the 400-hour lifetime requirement
of the CSM system.
MSC would contract directly with Pratt & Whitney for CSM cell development
followed by complete CSM module testing for a 1,000-hour CSM module at a cost of
approximately $2.5 million. Grumman was scheduled to propose to ASPO their
battery contractor selection on April 29, 1965.
Memorandum, Phillips to Mueller, "Plans for LEM Fuel Cell Termination and
Related Effort," sgd. John H. Disher, April 12, 1965.
April 12
MSC awarded MIT a new $15,529,000 contract to design guidance
and navigation equipment for Apollo spacecraft.
MSC, "Quarterly Activity Report for Office of the Associate Administrator,
Manned Space Flight, for Period Ending April 30, 1965," p. 25.
April 13
Marshall Space Flight Center finalized a $2,697,546 addition to
an existing contract with Douglas Aircraft Company to provide for environmental
testing of a full-scale S-IVB forward stage simulator, a full-scale test
instrument unit, and an Apollo thermal simulator. Testing would be conducted in
Douglas' 11.89-m- (39-ft-) diameter space simulator at Huntington Beach,
California, and would simulate a typical Saturn V flight from launch to earth
orbit and injection into lunar path.
Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1965, p. 182; Space Business
Daily, April 27, 1965, p. 317.
April 14
Construction workers emplaced the final beam in the structural
skeleton of the Vertical Assembly Building at Merritt Island (KSC), Florida.
Scheduled for completion in 1966, the cavernous structure (160 m [525 ft] tall
and comprising 10,968,476 cu m [129 million cu ft]) would provide a controlled
environment for assembling Saturn V launch vehicles and mating them to Apollo
spacecraft.
Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1965, p. 184.
April 15
The first firing of the LEM ascent engine test rig (HA-3) was
successfully conducted at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. A second firing
on April 23 lasted 14.45 sec instead of 10 sec as planned. A third firing,
lasting 30 sec, completed the test series. A helium pressurization system would
be installed before additional testing could begin.
"Monthly Progress Report No. 27," LPR-10-43, pp. 1, 13; GAEC, "Monthly
Progress Report No. 28," LPR- 10-44, June 10, 1965, p. 1.
April 15
ASPO informed North American that a meeting would be held at
its Downey, California, plant April 20-23 to negotiate and have signed off all
Block I and Block II suit interface control documents (ICDs) and the government
furnished equipment ICDs. Hamilton Standard, Grumman, and David Clark were being
instructed to have representation present to achieve the signed ICDs. North
American was instructed to have the ICDs in final form to be signed or
negotiated.
TWX, C. L. Taylor, MSC, to NAA, Attn: J. C. Cozad, April 15, 1965.
Mid month
Officials from North American and the three NASA centers most
concerned (MSFC, KSC, and MSC) discussed the environmental umbilical arrangement
for the CM. The current configuration hampered rapid crew egress and therefore
did not meet emergency requirements. This group put forth several alternative
designs, including lengthening the umbilical hood and relocating the door or
hatch.
Internal Letter, E. P. Smith, NAA, to Distr., "Trip Report - MSFC - Command
Module Environmental Umbilical Interface," April 15, 1965.
April 15-22
Grumman reviewed the engineering simulation program. The
total cost was anticipated at $9 million.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, April 15-22, 1965."
April 15-22
At North American, ultrasonic inspection of the forward
portion of airframe 007 disclosed only minor imperfections in the bonding,
called "a dramatic demonstration of the improvement in the bonding process."
(See April 1-8.)
Ibid.
April 15-22
MSC and Grumman reviewed the program for the LEM's reaction
control system. The only issue outstanding was Grumman's in-house effort: MSC
felt that that effort was "overestimated" and that the manufacturer alone should
not handle support from subcontractors.
Ibid.; memorandum, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to Assistant Manager,
ASPO, Attn: H. L. Reynolds, "LEM RCS Status," April 22, 1965.
April 15-22
North American began full-scale developmental testing on the
CM's uprighting system.
"ASPO Weekly Management Report, April 15-22, 1965"; "Apollo Monthly Progress
Report;' SID 62-300- 37, p. 3.
April 16
MSFC conducted the first clustered firing of the Saturn V's
first stage (the S-IC). The booster's five F-1 engines burned for about 6½
seconds and produced 33,360 kilonewtons (7.5 million lbs) thrust. George E.
Mueller, Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, emphasized the
significance of this test, calling it "one of the key milestones in the whole
lunar landing program."
Eight days later, at its static facility in Santa Susana, California, North
American first fired the S-II, intermediate stage of the Saturn V. The event was
chronicled as the "second major Saturn V milestone" during April.
Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1965, pp. 188, 198; Space
Business Daily, April 20, 1965, p. 276; Ibid., April 28,
1965, p. 322.
April 16
Owen E. Maynard, Chief of MSC's Systems Engineering Division,
announced that the ordering of objectives into first, second, and third order
had been discontinued and replaced with two classifications: primary and
secondary objectives. Primary objectives were defined as those which were
mandatory. Malfunctions of spacecraft or launch vehicle systems, ground
equipment, or instrumentation which would result in failure to achieve these
objectives would be cause to hold or cancel the mission until the malfunction
had been eliminated. Secondary objectives were those considered desirable but
not mandatory. Malfunctions resulting in failure to achieve these objectives
would be cause to hold or cancel the mission as indicated in Mission Rules.
Memorandum, Owen E. Maynard, MSC, to Distr., "Changes to objective
classification," April 16, 1965.
April 16-May 15
Two CSM fuel cells failed qualification testing, the
first failing after 101.75 hrs of the vacuum endurance test. Pratt and Whitney
Aircraft determined that the failure was caused by a cleaning fluid which
contaminated and plugged the oxygen lines and contaminated the oxygen gas at the
electrodes. The fuel cell would be rebuilt for qualification testing and test
preparation procedures were to be revised.
An internal short circuit occurred in the second fuel cell 16 hrs before the
end of the 400-hour qualification test. In spite of the failure the fuel cell
met the current Block I mission specification and did not need to be redesigned.
"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-37, p. 10.
April 16-May 15
North American completed qualification testing on the
fuel tanks for the SM's reaction control system.
Ibid., p. 11; NAA, "Project Apollo Spacecraft Test Program
Weekly Activity Report (12 April 1965 through 18 April 1965)," p. 3.
April 16-May 15
On the basis of current systems reliabilities and the
design reference mission, North American estimated at one in a hundred the
possibility that returning Apollo crewmen would land on solid ground rather than
on water. The contractor used this estimate in formulating test programs for
boilerplate 28 and spacecraft 002A and 007.
"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-37, p. 12.
April 16-May 15
North American halted testing on the hydrogen tanks for
the CSM, produced by Beech, because of weld failures. Testing on a redesigned
tank assembly began on May 8.
Ibid., p. 9; "Project Apollo Spacecraft Test Program Weekly
Activity Report (12 April through 18 April 1965)," p. 5.
April 19-26
North American, Hamilton Standard, Grumman, David Clark, and
MSC representatives, meeting in Downey, California, resolved all interfaces
between the space suit and the two blocks of spacecraft. As a result of these
agreements, MSC directed North American and Grumman to make some minor changes
(suggested by the Crew Systems Division) in the communications cables; to remove
the portable life support systems from the CM; and to add a thermal-meteoroid
garment - rather than one providing merely thermal protection - to the CM.
"ASPO Weekly Management Report, April 22-29, 1965"; memorandum, Richard S.
Johnston, MSC, to Chief, Systems Engineering Division, "Extravehicular Mobility
Unit (EMU) thermal and meteoroid protection," April 9, 1965; memorandum,
Johnston to Asst. Chief, Program Control Division, Attn: G. J. Stoops,
"Implementation of RECP's pertaining to Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU)
thermal and meteoroid protection," April 21, 1965.
April 20
NASA and Boeing negotiated a contract modification. For an
additional $3,135,977, Boeing would furnish instrumentation equipment and
engineering support for Marshall Space Flight Center's program for dynamic
testing of the Saturn V.
Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1965, p. 191; Space Business
Daily, April 22, 1965, p. 291.
April 20
At the initial design engineering inspection (DEI) of
Spacecraft 009, held at Downey, California, MSC and North American officials
reviewed the compatibility of the vehicle with SA-201 mission requirements. The
DEI Review Board approved 11 hardware changes and assigned 26 others for further
study.
Memorandum, Daniel A. Nebrig, MSC, to Distr., "Minutes of Houston Board
Review for AFRM 009 DEI - Phase I," April 20, 1965; "Apollo Monthly Progress
Report," SID 62-300-37, p. 3.
April 20
The ASPO CSM Project Officer, C. L. Taylor, said that immediate
action must be taken to reduce the FY 1965 expenditures on the CSM program by $5
million. Toward that end, he directed attention to a cost reduction program,
"Project Squeeze," and said that a joint North American/NASA Project Squeeze had
been in operation several months and had resulted in significant program
reductions. However, the majority of items recommended for investigation were
North American-oriented.
Taylor requested items for consideration be submitted no later than April 27,
1965, and pointed out some specifics which might be considered:
- qualification programs, hardware quantities, tests, etc.,
- component testing,
- analytical effort,
- design to excess,
- documentation, and
- changes.
Memorandum, C. L. Taylor, MSC, to Distr., "Project
Squeeze," April 20, 1965.
April 20
MSC requested Grumman to make provisions for storage of two
additional portable life support system (PLSS) batteries. This was an increase
of two batteries over the previous requirement; requirement now was for two
batteries in the PLSS and additional storage for six.
TWX, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, April 20, 1965.
April 20
MSC's Systems Engineering Division requested that Grumman be
advised to terminate the RCA systems engineering subcontract as soon as
possible. It had been determined that this contract was no longer useful. Based
on data presented by Grumman during a program review, an immediate and complete
termination would save about $45,000.
Memorandum, Owen E. Maynard, MSC, to Chief, Contract Engineering Branch, "LEM
Program Review Contract NAS 9-1100, RCA Systems Engineering Sub-Contract," April
20, 1965.
April 21-22
Grumman and MSC engineers discussed the effect of landing
impacts on the structure of the LEM. Based on analyses of critical loading
conditions, Grumman reported that the present configuration was inadequate.
Several possible solutions were being studied jointly by Grumman and the
Structures and Mechanics Division (SMD):
- Strengthening the spacecraft's structure (which would increase the weight
of the ascent and descent stages by 19 and 32 kg [42 and 70 lbs],
respectively)
- Modifying the gear
- Reducing factors of safety and landing dynamics, including vertical
velocity at touchdown
A decision was expected from SMD by June 1.
Also Grumman representatives summarized the company's study on the design of
the footpads. They recommended that, rather than adopting a stroking-type
design, the current rigid footpad should be modified. The modification, they
said, would improve performance as much as would the stroking design, without
entailing the latter's increased weight and complexity and lowered reliability.
SMD was evaluating Grumman's recommendations.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, April 22-29, 1965."
April 22
MSC completed the program review on the electrical power system
for the LEM and approved the cost through completion of the program (about $23.2
million).
Ibid.
April 22
The MSC Systems Engineering Division published revisions to
Apollo Mission 204A objectives and mission requirements. The principal
difference between the revised version and the Initial Mission Directive for
Mission 204 was the expansion of the secondary propulsion system performance
objective, the radiation survey meter objective, which was deleted, and the
don/doff of the Block I pressure garment and thermal blanket objectives which
had also been deleted.
Memorandum, Owen E. Maynard, MSC, to Apollo Trajectory Support Office,
"Revisions to Apollo Mission 204A objectives and mission requirements," sgd. C.
H. Perrine, April 22, 1965.
April 22
The LEM Project Officer notified Grumman that the President's
Scientific Advisory Committee (PSAC) had established sub-panels to work on
specific technical areas, beyond the full PSAC briefings. One of the sub-panels
was concerned with the environmental control subsystem, including space suits.
This group desired representation from Hamilton Standard to discuss with regard
to the LEM-ECS its interpretation of the reliability design requirements, its
implementation through development and test phases, its demonstration of
reliability, and its frank assessment of confidence in these measures. Briefing
material should be available to the sub-panel by May 17, 1965, with a primary
discussion meeting to be held at Hamilton Standard on May 24.
TWX, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, April 22, 1965;
TWX, W. L. Conn, MSC, to Hamilton Standard, Attn: E. V. Marshall, April 22,
1965.
April 22
Grumman was requested to ship ground support equipment and
associated equipment to field test sites as soon as it was available.
TWX, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, April 22, 1965.
April 22
Grumman was requested to attend a meeting at MSC and to present
their reasons as to why the LEM reaction control system (RCS) propellant tanks
could not be of common technology with the CSM RCS propellant tanks. Grumman was
to also say why an additional development program was required for the LEM
tanks.
TWX, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, April 22, 1965.
April 22-23
North American conducted the final zero-g trials (part of
developmental testing on the CM's waste management system) and reported good
results for both urine and feces apparatus.
"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-37, p. 4.
April 22-29
After reviewing the status of the LEM landing simulation
program, the Guidance and Control Division reported that "significant data" from
the Bell training vehicle were more than a year away.
"ASPO Weekly Management Report, April 22-29, 1965."
April 22-29
Allison Division of General Motors Corporation completed an
analysis of failures in the LEM descent stage's propellant tanks. Investigators
placed the blame on brittle forgings. MSC's Propulsion and Power Division
reported that "efforts are continuing to insure [that] future forgings will be
satisfactory."
Ibid.
April 22-29
Crews Systems Division reported that work on the suit visors
was progressing well, and that operational mockups had been sent to North
American for the upcoming critical design review. The visor could be attached
and detached by a pressurized crewman; also, it afforded thermal protection and
allowed a complete range of light attenuation.
Ibid.
April 22-29
North American updated the electrical power profile for
spacecraft 011:
|
Requirement (watt-hours) |
| Prelaunch |
159 |
| Ascent |
4457 |
| Entry |
1032 |
| Postlanding |
2288 |
During the flight, the entry and landing
batteries would supplement the spacecraft's fuel cells; three auxiliary
batteries would power the mission control programmer and the instrumentation. At
touchdown, all batteries would supply energy for postlanding requirements.
Ibid.
April 23
MSC and Grumman conducted the design engineering inspection on
LEM test article 10. Structures and Mechanics Division called it "significant"
that there were no requests for design changes. The vehicle was ready for
shipment to Tulsa, Oklahoma, for static testing by North American, but, at the
latter's request, delivery was delayed until May 28.
Ibid.; letter, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney,
"Contract NAS 9-1100, Minutes of the LTA-10 Development Engineering Inspection,"
April 29, 1965, with enclosure: "Minutes of LTA-10 Development Engineering
Inspection, April 23, 1965."
April 26
North American received CM 009 forward and crew compartment
heatshields from Avco Corporation. These heatshields were the first CM
heatshields received by the contractor with complete ablative application.
"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-37, p. 1.
April 26
Operating on a round-the-clock schedule, researchers at Langley
Research Center began simulations of high-altitude aborts and CSM-active
dockings. (See July 7-9.)
"ASPO Weekly Management Report, April 22-29, 1965."
April 26-May 2
Using boilerplate 14, North American simulated the
mission for spacecraft 009. The test was conducted in two phases, with the
vehicle on external and then internal power. All data showed satisfactory
performance.
NAA, "Project Apollo Spacecraft Test Program Weekly Activity Report (Period
26 April 1965 through 2 May 1965),"
April 27
ASPO announced that a LEM Test Program Requirement Review would
be held at Grumman during the first week in June. The purpose of the review
would be to reach agreement with Grumman on an overall Test Program Plan and to
consider planned allocation of hardware, test schedules, and test logic in
relationship to flight missions.
The review would result in publication of a certification document which
would define and catalog the program of testing, analysis, and rationalization
which would form the basis for certification of flight spacecraft as capable of
meeting requirements of flight missions. It would cover all formal qualification
testing above the part level being done at subcontractors or vendors, component
testing at Grumman, higher level of assembly testing conducted anywhere in
support of a portion of test logic, and individual system test requirements to
be conducted on integrated test vehicles such as LEM test article 1.
The format for the review would consist of individual subsystem test program
reviews by the respective MSC and Grumman Subsystem Managers. MSC Subsystem
Managers would be supported by RASPO, ASPO, and GE personnel where appropriate.
After their initial meeting, the MSC and Grumman managers would summarize their
findings to a MSC Grumman review board, emphasizing deficiencies in the program
(to include inadequate tests, hardware availability problems, and schedules
which were inconsistent with flight support requirements).
Memorandum, Owen E. Maynard, MSC, to Distribution, "LEM Test Program
Requirements Review," April 27, 1965.
April 27
North American summarized its position on the design of the CM
for earth impact in a letter to MSC. A number of meetings had taken place since
the NASA North American Technical Management Meeting February 25, 1964, at which
the decision was made to reorient Apollo impact to water as the primary landing
site.
The letter reviewed the history of boilerplate 28 drop tests and a series of
MSC North American meetings during the last two months of 1964 and the first two
of 1965. On February 12, at a meeting at Downey, California, North American had
recommended:
- Design for 0.99999 criteria.
- Retain the 27.5 degrees hang angle to eliminate the requirement for
redesign of upper crew compartment side wall. The dual hang angle
configuration should be eliminated for spacecraft 017 and subsequently through
Block II.
- Allow plastic deformation of the aft heatshield.
- Continue investigation of possible upper deck and tunnel problems.
- Fly spacecraft 009 with a probability of success at water impact of 0.999,
and continue boilerplate 28 testing to give assurance of meeting this
criterion.
In a follow-up meeting on March 2, NASA gave concurrence to
these recommendations in the form of signed meeting minutes.
At the time of the April 27 letter, North American was implementing the
design changes defined in the Apollo CM design changes for water impact. The
changes were based on North American's best understanding of agreements between
it and MSC regarding criteria, loads, definition of the ultimate land envelope,
structural analysis, and the requirement that no-leakage integrity within the
ultimate load level be demonstrated by test.
Letter, J. G. Cozad, North American, to NASA MSC, Attn: J. B. Alldredge,
"Contract NAS 9-150, R&D for Project Apollo Spacecraft Design of Apollo
Command Module for Earth Impact," April 27, 1965.
April 27
LEM Project Officer W. F. Rector III, in a letter to Grumman,
established the minimum acceptable NASA requirements for accomplishing the
inspection, acceptance, and delivery operations at Bethpage, N.Y., on flight and
major ground test vehicles.
Following manufacture, and prior to NASA acceptance, the spacecraft must
undergo a thorough checkout by the contractor with MSC participating as an
active member of a checkout team. Through experience in Projects Mercury and the
CSM portion of Apollo, a team concept of operations had evolved for the
aforementioned activities. The concept had proved highly successful in providing
a balance of MSC and contractor personnel which assured that the evaluation of
problems received proper attention and resulted in solutions acceptable to both
NASA and the contractors. In addition, this "cross pollination" of skills
provided a more complete evaluation of the spacecraft performance and systems
anomalies.
Prior to starting acceptance testing, all systems should have completed a
pre-installation acceptance check, been installed in the spacecraft, and the
configuration verified. Acceptance checkout would begin following complete
installation of all subsystems and hook-up to the Acceptance Checkout Equipment
(ACE). After ACE was installed, individual subsystems tests were to be
performed. The hook-up of ACE to the spacecraft would constitute the point at
which the checkout team would assume responsibility for the vehicle. At that
time a documentation system must provide a means for authorizing and permanently
recording all work and testing to be performed on the spacecraft.
Letter, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, "Contract NAS
9-1100, NASA Requirements for Inspection, Acceptance and Delivery Operations at
Bethpage," April 27, 1965.
April 27-30
Part II of the Critical Design Review of the crew
compartment and docking system for the Block II CM was held at Downey,
California, using mockups 28 and 27 A. (Part I had been held on March 23-24.)
- Systems Engineering Division reported 49 design changes were requested in
the crew compartment, 45 of which were acted upon. The two most serious
problems were:
- stowage of the portable life support systems;
- and the crewmen's knees striking the main display console at impact.
- Structures and Mechanics Division reported a number of minor changes to
the docking system, primarily to simplify crew transfer and operation of the
hatch mechanisms.
- Crew Systems Division (CSD) engineers evaluated the compatibility of the
space suit and MSC's new in- house helmet with the Block II spacecraft. CSD
reported that the suits were sufficiently mobile and afforded adequate
visibility; problems with the shoulders, experienced in early versions of the
suit, had been solved; and while the three crewmen still quite literally
rubbed elbows, this problem also had been alleviated and no longer hampered
the crew's performance.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, April
29-May 6, 1965."
April 28
NASA Administrator James E. Webb, Deputy Administrator Hugh L.
Dryden, and Associate Administrator Robert C. Seamans, Jr., decided that the
announcement of any Apollo crew should be delayed as long as feasible without
jeopardizing training schedules. They reasoned that as long as the entire
astronaut group was undergoing generalized Apollo training, and until individual
mission planning was complete, there should be no need to make even tentative
crew selections.
Memorandum, Seamans to Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight George
E. Mueller, "Apollo Crew Selection," April 28, 1965.
April 28
Joseph F. Shea, ASPO Manager, approved Crew Systems Division's
recommendation to retain the "shirtsleeve" environment for the CM. The design
was simpler and promised greater overall mission reliability; also, it would be
more comfortable for the crewmen. Wearing part of the space suit would compound
problems with humidity and condensation inside the cabin. Accordingly, the crew
would be clad only in their constant-wear garments or would be fully suited.
(MSC and North American had explored the feasibility of putting a water
separator in the cabin heat exchanger for airframe 012. It was hoped that,
through partially suited operations, the crew could gain confidence in the
spacecraft's pressurization system. North American advised, however, that
considerable cost and schedule impacts could be expected. Moreover, such a
device would be only partly successful -condensation would still be a major
problem, Shea therefore vetoed the water separator and the idea of partially
suited operations during the first manned Apollo flight.)
Memorandum, Joseph F. Shea, MSC, to Distr., "Wear of space suits in C/M,"
April 28, 1965.
April 28-May 3
Under NASA contract, proton irradiation of primates tests
were conducted on the Oak Ridge cyclotron by a team from Brooks AFB and Crew
Systems Division. During this period, 136 monkeys and 900 mice were irradiated.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, May 6-13, 1965."
April 29-May 6
Portable life support systems (PLSS) stowed against the
aft bulkhead in the CM would prevent the crew couch from stroking fully. This
condition would be aggravated if, at impact, the bulkhead was forced inward.
North American spokesmen maintained that, in a water landing, the bulkhead would
give only slightly and that the couch struts would not compress to their limits.
They argued, therefore, that this condition would be of concern only in a land
landing. On the contrary, said MSC. Center officials were adamant that any
interference was absolutely unacceptable: it would lessen the attenuation
capability of the couch (thereby jeopardizing crew safety); possibly, the
bulkhead might even be ruptured (with obviously disastrous results). Because of
this problem - and because the capability for extravehicular transfer from the
CM to the LEM was required - MSC invited representatives from the three
contractors involved to meet in Houston to deal with the question of PLSS
stowage. (See May 12.)
"ASPO Weekly Management Report, April 29-May 6, 1965"; memorandum, Charles R.
Haines, MSC, to Owen E. Maynard, "PLSS," May 25, 1965.
April 29-May 6
Grumman recommended redundant pyrotechnic or solenoid
valves in the propellant system of the LEM's ascent stage. Thus the firm could
meet NASA's ground rule that no single failure would cause the mission to be
aborted.
"ASPO Weekly Management Report, April 29-May 6, 1965."
April 29-May 6
The Flight Projects Division (FPD) proposed a change in
the checkout procedure at Merritt Island (KSC). The idea, drawn from Gemini,
would eliminate checkout at the environmental control system (ECS) facility.
Basically, FPD's plan was to transport the mated CSM directly from the
Operations and Checkout Building to the altitude chamber, where the ECS would be
tested. Officials at North American approved the new procedure, and FPD
requested the Checkout and Test Division to study its feasibility.
Ibid.
April 30
Grumman advised MSC that it had selected the Eagle-Picher
Company as vendor for batteries in both stages of the LEM. At the same time,
because a proposal by Yardney Electric Company promised a sizable weight saving,
this latter firm would produce "pre-production" models for the ascent stage.
Ibid.
April 30
North American announced an Apollo Engineering Reorganization,
designed to improve operational efficiency and to be consistent with existing
requirements of the Apollo program. The reorganization would: (1) increase the
number of managers, but reduce the individual manager's scope and eliminate one
level of management, making for clearer assignments and better communications;
(2) incorporate certain checkout and ground support equipment systems
engineering functions into Systems Engineering, strengthening the integration
capabilities and simplifying operational procedures; and (3) basic functions of
analytical engineering within Apollo Engineering were being transferred to the
Research and Engineering Division, increasing the effective use of technical and
management personnel.
NAA, Organization Announcement, Dale D. Myers, Apollo Program Manager, and H.
G. Osbon, Chief Engineer, Apollo Engineering, to Apollo Engineering Supervision,
"Apollo Engineering Reorganization," April 30, 1965.
April 30
A tentative agreement was reached between Grumman and MSC
propulsion personnel concerning the Propulsion System Development Facility's
test scheduling at White Sands operations in regard to stand occupancy times
relating to the ascent and descent development rigs. The tentative schedule
showed that the ascent LEM Test Article (LTA)-5 vehicle would not start testing
until April 1967. The PA-1 rig prototype ascent propulsion rig) would therefore
be required to prove the final design and support early LEMs.
The PA-1 rig was designed and was being fabricated to accommodate small
propellant tanks, and there were no plans to update it with larger ones.
Therefore, advantages of flexibility, running tests of longer sustained
durations, and with the final tank outlet configurations would not be realized.
Grumman was requested to take immediate action to have the rig accommodate the
larger tanks and install the smaller tanks by use of adapters or other methods.
TWX, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, April 30, 1965.
April 30
As a result of the decision for an all-battery LEM, MSC advised
Grumman that power for the entire pre- separation checkout of the spacecraft
would be drawn from that module's batteries (instead of only during the 30
minutes prior to separation). This change simplified the electrical mating
between the two spacecraft and obviated an additional battery charger in the
CSM. From docking until the start of the checkout, however, the CSM would still
furnish power to the LEM.
TWX, James L. Neal, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney. April 30, 1965.
During the Month
Grumman reported two major problems with the LEM's descent engine:
- Space Technology Laboratories (STL) asked that the thrust chamber be
lengthened by 13.9 cm (5.5 in). Weight penalty would be 11.3 kg (25 lbs).
- STL concluded that, if used with Grumman's heatshield, the current nozzle
extension would melt.
"Monthly Progress Report No. 27," LPR-10-43, pp.
3, 13.
