Advanced Design, Fabrication, and Testing
June 1965
1965
June 1
ASPO Manager Joseph F. Shea replied to a recommendation by the
Assistant Director for Flight Operations to incorporate warning lights in Block
I and II CMs to indicate failure of the gimbal actuator secondary drive motors.
ASPO decided that no failure indication would be provided for the redundant
drive motors in Block I spacecraft because:
- in-flight checkout procedures would provide for exercising the gimbal
actuators by the primary and secondary drive motors prior to service
propulsion system burns; and
- all manned Block I missions would be conducted in earth orbit and reaction
control system deorbit capability was stipulated.
The warning lights
would be incorporated in Block II spacecraft, and the in-flight checkout
procedures would also apply to Block II lunar missions.
Memorandum, Joseph F. Shea, MSC, to Assistant Director for Flight Operations,
"Service Propulsion System (SPS) Secondary Gimbal Motor Fail Indication," June
1, 1965.
June 2
In an attempt to reduce the overall preflight time in connection
with lunar landing research vehicle (LLRV) activities, a meeting was held at
Flight Research Center. Principal participants were Ray White, Leroy Frost,
Leonard Ferrier, Joe Walker, Don Mallick, Cal Jarvis, Jim Adkins, Zeon Zwink,
Wayne Ottinger, and Gene Matranga.
The session commenced with an estimate of time required to perform each of
the functions on the preflight checklist. Review indicated that preflight might
be shortened in several ways:
- since the radar altimeter and doppler radar units did not affect safety of
flights, it was suggested that radar checks on flight mornings be reduced to a
minimum or be performed without inspection coverage;
- addition of ac and dc voltmeters in the cockpit would eliminate need for
power checks during the avionics preflight;
- when the weight and drag computer had been properly checked in flight, the
weight and drag preflight check could be streamlined down from the 30 minutes
currently required; and
- investigate the need to refill H2O2 after prime.
In general, though
several operations were performed simultaneously during most of preflight, it
appeared other operations could be performed in parallel and thereby reduce
overall preflight time. Memorandum for Files, "LLRV Preflight Procedures," Gene
J. Matranga, June 2, 1965.
June 2
ASPO advised North American that, at present, no unmanned flights
were planned for the Block II CM. After the company concluded its own analysis
of Apollo requirements, MSC would determine whether the heatshield must be
verified prior to manned missions. But because of the long "lead time" involved,
North American should continue securing the requisite instrumentation pending a
final decision.
TWX, C. L. Taylor, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Systems Division, Attn:
J. C. Cozad, subject: "Requirements for Mission Programmers and Heat Shield
Measurements in Block II CSM," June 2, 1965.
June 3
Northrop-Ventura began qualification testing of the earth landing
system for Apollo with a drop of boilerplate 19 at El Centro, Calif. The entire
landing sequence took place as planned; all parachutes performed well.
"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-38, pp. 2-3.
June 6
NASA launched Gemini IV, America's second multi-manned space
mission, piloted by astronauts James A. McDivitt and Edward H. White II, from
Cape Kennedy. Gemini IV's primary objective was to evaluate the performance of
man and machine during prolonged space flight. Also during this flight, White
opened the hatch on his spacecraft and performed America's first "space walk."
On June 7, after four days in space, McDivitt and White landed their vehicle in
the Atlantic Ocean some 724 km (450 mi) east of the Cape.
James M. Grimwood and Barton C. Hacker with Peter J. Vorzimmer, Project
Gemini Technology and Operations: A Chronology (NASA SP-4002, 1969), pp.
200-202.
June 3-10
MSC approved North American's recommendation that a programmer
timer approach be used for earth reacquisition by the CSM's S-band high-gain
antenna.
"ASPO Weekly Management Report, June 3-10, 1965."
June 5
ASPO Manager Joseph F. Shea concluded, after reviewing the
boilerplate 22 mission, that all the test objectives would be met satisfactorily
either in the flight of spacecraft 002 or in the ground qualification program.
For that reason the boilerplate 22 flight would not be repeated. Memorandum,
Shea to Distr., "Test Objectives," June 5, 1965.
June 6-12
ASPO reported a number of significant activities in its Weekly
Activity Report.
- The CSM design engineering inspection was satisfactorily conducted at
North American June 8-10.
- Qualification of the Apollo standard initiator was successfully completed
by Space Ordnance Systems, Inc.
- The first full systems firing of the LEM ascent engine was accomplished at
Bell Aerosystems using the heavyweight ascent (HA)-2 propulsion test rig.
- The LEM development program was revised and LEM test article (LTA)-4,
LTA-5 ascent stage, flight test article (FTA)-1, and FTA-2 were
eliminated.
"Weekly Activity Report, June 6-12, 1965,"sgd. Joseph F.
Shea.
June 7
George E. Mueller, Associate Administrator for Manned Space
Flight, approved procurement of the lunar surface experiments package (LSEP).
The package, to be deployed on the moon by each LEM crew that landed there,
would transmit geophysical and other scientific data back to earth. NASA's
Office of Space Science and Applications would make the final selection of
experiments. Mueller emphasized that the LSEP must be ready in time for the
first lunar landing mission. Management responsibility for the project was
assigned to MSC's Experiments Program Office.
Memorandum, George E. Mueller, NASA, to MSC, Attn: Dave Lang, "Request for
Approval of Procurement Plan for Lunar Surface Experiments Package," June 7,
1965; NASA OMSF, Apollo Program Directive No. 3, "Management Assignment for the
Lunar Surface Experiments Package (LSEP) Project," June 15, 1965.
June 7
Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips approved MSC's request
for revised velocity budgets for the two spacecraft. It was understood that
these new values would:
- still meet the free return trajectory constraint; and
- increase (to at least two degrees) the LEM's out-of-plane launch
capability. MPAD/FOD provided the analysis and recommendations leading to this
decision.
Letter, Samuel C. Phillips, NASA, to MSC, Attn: Director,
ASPO, "Revised Apollo Spacecraft Delta V Budget (U), per letter dated May 18,
1965, Reference PS8/L-82/65," June 7, 1965; Memorandum, Carl R. Huss, JSC, to
JSC Historical Office, "Comments on Volume III of The Apollo Spacecraft: A
Chronology," June 6, 1973.
June 7
MSC directed NAA to make a "predesign" study of a rocket landing
system for the Block II CM. (The Center had already studied the system's
feasibility and had conducted full-scale drop tests.)
Letter, C. L. Taylor, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Systems Division,
Attn: J. C. Cozad, "Contract NAS 9-150, CM Rocket Landing System Study Meeting,
15 June 1965," June 22, 1965, with enclosure, "Minutes of Rocket Landing System
Study Meeting," June 15, 1965; TWX, J. C. Ellis, NAA, to NASA Headquarters,
Attn: Director, Procurement and Supply Division, July 15, 1965.
June 7-13
North American's Rocketdyne Division began qualification
testing on the CM's reaction control system engines.
NAA, "Project Apollo Spacecraft Test Program Weekly Activity Report (Period 7
June 1965 through 13 June 1965)," p. 3.
June 8
Russia launched Luna VI, an instrumented moon probe.
Tass reported that all onboard equipment was functioning normally. Two days into
the flight, however, the spacecraft's engine failed to shut down following a
midcourse correction. This failure caused Luna VI to miss its
target by more than 160,000 km (99,419 mi).
Space Business Daily, June 11, 1965, p. 216; Tikhonravov,
et al., Ten Years of Space Research in the USSR, p.
17.
June 8-10
MSC reviewed a lighting mockup of the crew compartment in the
Block II CM. The design concept, though needing further refinement, was deemed
acceptable. Engineers from Crew Systems Division found that lights on the
fingertips of the suit gloves worked quite well; optimum positioning was as yet
undetermined, however. At the same time, MSC reviewed the design of the Block I
side hatch (i.e., not modified to meet Block II extravehicular requirements).
Reviewers found North American's major problems were warpage and crew ingress
from space. Further, the design of both side hatches needed "additional
coordination" with that of the umbilical access arm of the launch tower to
ensure compatibility.
"ASPO Weekly Management Report, June 3-10, 1965"; "ASPO Weekly Management
Report, June 10-17, 1965."
June 9
Crew Systems Division reported that MSC had ordered Hamilton
Standard to integrate seven layers of thermal protection into the A5H pressure
suit.
Memorandum, Francis J. DeVos and William C. Kincaide, MSC, to Record,
"Meeting on June 9, 1965, to discuss thermal and meteoroid protection for the
Apollo Extravehicular Mobility Unit," June 22, 1965.
June 10-17
Crew Systems Division reported that, as currently designed,
the environmental control system (ECS) in the LEM would not afford adequate
thermal control for an all-battery spacecraft. Grumman was investigating several
methods for improving the ECS's thermal capability, and was to recommend a
modified configuration for the coolant loop.
Memorandum, Owen E. Maynard, MSC, to Distr., "LEM battery thermal control
problem," June 17, 1965.
June 10-17
NASA hired the U.S. Navy's Air Crew Equipment Laboratory
(ACEL) to study several physiological aspects of pure-oxygen environments.
Primarily, ACEL's study would try to determine: (1) whether known effects (such
as lung collapse) could somehow be reversed; and (2) whether such environments
enhanced respiratory infections.
"ASPO Weekly Management Report, June 10-17, 1965."
June 10-17
A list of materials that North American reported using in the
CM's habitable area omitted more than 70 items that had appeared in earlier such
reports. MSC ordered the company to determine why. This item could affect the
course of backup toxicity testing. Materials listed as "used but not tested"
were given highest priority in toxicity testing.
Ibid.
June 11
MSC ordered Grumman to propose a gaseous oxygen storage
configuration for the LEM's environmental control system (ECS), including all
oxygen requirements and system weights. Because no decision was yet made on
simultaneous surface excursions by the crew, Grumman should design the LEM's ECS
for either one-or two-man operations. And the Center further defined
requirements for cabin repressurizations and replenishment of the portable life
support systems. Oxygen quantities and pressures would be worked out on the
basis of these ground rules. (See July 1-8.)
TWX, R. Wayne Young, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, June 11, 1965.
June 11
The question of whether a data tape recorder would be installed
on LEM-1 had been discussed at several Apollo 206 Mission Operations Plan
meetings and there was a strong possibility it would not be installed.
In a memorandum to ASPO Manager Joseph F. Shea, Assistant Director for Flight
Operations Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., pointed out that his Directorate had
responsibility to ASPO of insuring "that all possible test objectives are
accomplished. This is done not only by real-time conduct of the mission, but
also through considerable premission planning which integrates the desired
profile with the Manned Space Flight Network. The underlying purpose of all
these operations activities is the accumulation of data, which for unmanned,
nonrecoverable spacecraft such as LEM-1 can only be provided through the use of
RE telemetry. The FOD (Flight Operations Directorate) does not believe the
Apollo 206A Mission Objectives can be assured of being accomplished without the
addition of a data tape recorder and associated playback transmitter. . . ."
Kraft said the tradeoff of weight and cost of a data recorder and dump
transmitter versus possible loss of data for primary mission objectives,
considering the cost of a Saturn IB launch vehicle, a fully functional LEM
spacecraft, and the ground support required, seemed inequitable. He recommended
that a data tape recorder and associated playback transmitter be installed on
LEM-1 (and 2) to ensure that test objectives were achieved.
Memorandum, Kraft to Shea,"LEM-1 Mission 206A Data Tape Recorder," June 11,
1965.
June 11
ASPO Manager Joseph F. Shea, in a memorandum to Robert Williams,
said that, confirming their discussion with Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., and
Donald K. Slayton, both had agreed that HE orbital communications in the Block
II Apollo spacecraft were not needed. Shea asked Williams to look into the
implications of removing the requirement.
Memorandum, Shea to Williams, "Block II communication system," June 12, 1965.
June 11
MSC and North American discussed the brittleness of the boost
protective cover and the possibility that, during tower jettison or abort, the
cover might break up and cause damage to the spacecraft. Having investigated a
number of various materials and construction techniques, North American
recommended adding a nylon fabric to strengthen the structure. Company engineers
believed that, thus reinforced, the cover would be less likely to tear apart in
flight. Even though this would increase the weight of the cover by about 27 kg
(60 lbs), MSC concurred. The change applied to both Block I and Block II CMs,
and was effective for spacecraft 002, 009, and all subsequent vehicles.
Letter, C. L. Taylor, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Systems Division,
Attn: J. C. Cozad, "Contract NAS 9-150, Implementation of Actions Recommended at
the NASA/NAA Boost Protective Cover Problem Area Review at MSC June 11, 1965,"
June 21, 1965, with enclosure: "Abstract of Proceedings, NASA/NAA Boost
Protective Cover Problem Area Review, MSC, June 11, 1965," June 14, 1965;
memorandum, Owen E. Maynard, MSC, to Chief, Structures and Mechanics Division,
"Action Items resulting from Boost Protective Cover Problem Area Review at MSC,
June 11, 1965," June 15, 1965; memorandum, Maynard, to Chief, C&SM Contract
Engineering Branch, "CCA to NAA on backing material for Boost Protective Cover,"
June 24, 1965.
June 12
Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips listed the RE
communications systems envisioned by NASA Headquarters on the first three
R&D LEMs and requested ASPO Manager Joseph F. Shea's comments.
The first three LEMs (LEM-1, LEM-2, and LEM-3) would be equipped with
communications equipment in addition to that required in the LEM for lunar
missions to provide:
- transmission of required engineering (R&D) data;
- redundant operational telemetry;
- updating of spacecraft equipment via an up-data command link; and
- redundant tracking capability.
The LEM R&D communications
system was essentially independent from the operational communications systems.
It would be housed primarily in the equipment bay (which on operational flights
would house the scientific payload equipment).
Letter, Phillips to Shea, "R&D Communications and Tracking systems in
LEMs 1, 2, 3," June 12, 1965.
June 12
Samuel C. Phillips, Apollo Program Director, noted MSC request
for support from Goddard Space Flight Center on LEM battery development as well
as Goddard's agreement to furnish limited support.
Phillips suggested to ASPO Manager Joseph F. Shea that since MSFC had much
experience in the design, development, and operational aspects of battery
systems, it was important to use their experience and recommended MSFC be
contacted if such action had not already occurred.
Memorandum, Phillips to Shea, "LEM Battery Development," June 12, 1965.
June 14
MSC Director Robert R. Gilruth appointed a Technical Working
Committee, headed by Edwin Samfield, to oversee the design of a Lunar Sample
Receiving Laboratory at the Center.
Memorandum, Robert R. Gilruth, MSC, to Chief, Engineering Division,
"Formation of a Technical Working Committee for the design of a Lunar Sample
Receiving Laboratory and designation of consultants to assist in the selection
of an architect-engineer firm," June 14, 1965.
June 14-15
Using a LEM mockup at Grumman, and with the assistance of
astronauts Roger B. Chaffee and Donn F. Eisele, engineers from Hamilton Standard
performed mobility tests of the reconfigured portable life support system
(PLSS). Crew Systems Division (CSD) reported that the reshaped back pack did not
hinder entering or leaving the spacecraft; and while some interference problems
were inescapable when the PLSSs were worn inside the spacecraft for any period
of time, CSD believed that damage could be prevented through training and by
limiting movement by the crew. Grumman, however, contended that the newer PLSSs
had "serious implications" for mobility inside the LEM.
GAEC, "Monthly Progress Report No. 29," LPR-10-45, July 10, 1965, p. 3; "ASPO
Weekly Management Report, June 10-17, 1965"; MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management
Report, June 17-24, 1965."
June 15
Independent studies were made at MSC and North American to
determine effects and impact of off-loading certain Block II service propulsion
system components for Saturn IB missions. The contractor was requested to
determine the weight change involved and schedule and cost impact of removing
one oxidizer tank, one fuel tank, one helium tank and all associated hardware
(fuel and oxidizer transfer lines, propellant quantity sensors and certain
gaging wire harnesses) from CSM 101 and CSM 103. The MSC study was oriented
toward determining technical problems associated with such a change and the
effects on spacecraft operational requirements.
The service module.
The North American study indicated that removing the equipment would save
about 690 000, along with a weight reduction of approximately 454 kg (1,000
lbs). Their report also indicated there would be no schedule impact provided
go-ahead was given for CSM 101 prior to June 1, 1965, and for CSM 103 prior to
November 1, 1965.
The MSC study indicated a maximum burn limitation of 280 seconds, due to
excessive drop in helium temperature; and also pointed out that the change to
the gaging system might not be as simple as North American stated because of the
arrangement of the secondary sensing system. However, those problems did not
appear insurmountable.
Memorandum, Owen E. Maynard, MSC, to Manager, ASPO, Attn: W. A. Lee,
"OffLoading Block II SPS Components for Saturn IB Missions," June 15, 1965.
June 15-18
In a series of meetings at Downey, Calif., MSC, Grumman, and
North American worked out most of the interface between the two spacecraft.
Among the most significant items yet unresolved were: the thermal environment of
the LEM during boost; and the structural loads and bending modes between the
docked spacecraft.
Letter, C. L. Taylor, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Systems Division,
Attn: J. C. Cozad, "Contract NAS 9-150, Resolution of CSM/LEM Interfaces,
MSC/NAA/GAEC Coordination Meetings No. 27 and 29, June 15-18 and June 24-25,
1965, respectively," July 28, 1965, with enclosure: "Minutes of Coordination
Meeting . . . ," June 24-25, 1965; "Monthly Progress Report No. 29," LPR-10-45,
p. 1.
June 16
At Bethpage, N.Y., officials from Grumman and the Flight
Projects Division (FPD) discussed the status of LEM-1. During early May, the
company had agreed to devise a comprehensive development plan for the
spacecraft, one that included hardware status; manufacturing and checkout
sequences; requirements for facilities, ground support equipment, and software;
and projected schedules. By mid-June, Grumman was still unprepared to discuss
details, however, and requested another month to work on the plan. FPD could no
longer remain patient: "It is the intention of this office," the division
reported to ASPO, "to conduct a monthly LEM-1 status meeting . . . until the
LEM-1 program plan is clearly defined."
Memorandum, J. Thomas Markley, MSC, to H. L. Reynolds, "Detailed LEM-1
working schedule," June 7, 1965; letter, R. Wayne Young, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R.
S. Mullaney, "Contract NAS 9-1100, LEM-1 Status Meeting," June 25, 1965; "ASPO
Weekly Management Report, June 10-17, 1965."
June 16
To prevent the CSM's contacting the LEM's radar antenna (a
problem disclosed during docking simulations), deviations in the CSM's roll
attitude would be limited to eight degrees or less.
"ASPO Weekly Management Report, June 17-24, 1965."
June 16
MSC ordered North American to revise the deployment angles of
the adapter panels: 45 degrees for separation, docking, and LEM withdrawal; and
- at most - 60 degrees for abort separation. (See December 7, 1964.)
Letter, J. B. Alldredge, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Systems Division,
"Contract Change Authorization No. 275, Revision 1," June 16, 1965; letter, H.
G. Osbon, NAA, to NASA MSC, Attn: C. L. Taylor, "Contract NAS 9-150, R&D for
Project Apollo Spacecraft Results of Action Item from Eleventh Flight Mechanics,
Dynamics, Guidance and Control Panel Meeting," June 29, 1965, with enclosure.
June 16
MSC directed Grumman to modify the LEM's pulse code modulation
and timing electronics assembly to enable it to telemeter data from the abort
electronics assembly (AEA). Thus, if data from the AEA disagreed with those from
the spacecraft's guidance computer, the two sets could be reconciled on the
ground (using inputs from the Manned Space Flight Network), relieving the
astronauts of this chore.
Letter, James L. Neal, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: John C. Snedeker, "Contract NAS
9-1100, Contract Change Authorization No. 112, Provide Capability in PCMTEA to
Telemeter AGS Computer Digital Data," June 16, 1965.
June 16
The net effect of a decision by ASPO Manager Joseph F. Shea in
May was that the total fuel cell effort at both Pratt and Whitney and North
American should be no more than $9.7 million during FY 1966. The decision as to
the distribution of the funds was left to the discretion of the fuel cell
subsystem manager.
Memorandum for Record, J. Thomas Markley, "C&SM Fuel Cell Effort," June
16, 1965.
June 16-23
Structures and Mechanics Division (SMD) reported that Grumman
had found two thermal problems with the LEM:
- On the basis of current predictions, the spacecraft's skin and several
antennas would overheat during the boost phase of the mission. SMD engineers,
after analyzing the problem, believed that an "acceptable LEM environment"
could be achieved by lessening the heat transferred from the inner panels of
the adapter and by increasing that emitted by the outer panels.
- Also, Grumman had reported that, when exposed to exhaust plumes from the
SM's reaction control engines, the LEM's skin would overheat in about five
seconds. "Since the LEM withdrawal . . . requires 20 to 26 sec RCS firing,"
SMD understated, "it is apparent that a problem exists." One suggested
solution involved improved insulation.
"ASPO Weekly Management Report,
June 17-24, 1965"; memorandum, Joseph N. Kotanchik, MSC, "Review of requirement
for Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation (GAEC) ground support equipment
(GSE) Item LDW-410-12050, Thermal Control System," June 30, 1965.
June 16-July 15
North American submitted a design proposal for a
scientific airlock for the CM (applicable to 014 and all Block II spacecraft).
Structural design was scheduled to begin shortly.
NAA, "Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-39, August 1, 1965, p. 4.
June 16-July 15
North American reported two service propulsion engine
failures at AEDC and a third at WSMR. At the first location, both failures were
attributed to separation of the thrust chamber from the injector assembly; in
the latter instance, weld deficiencies were the culprit. Analysis of all these
failures was continuing.
Ibid., p. 11.
June 17
MSC directed Hamilton Standard Division to study the feasibility
of incorporating a manual override in the current pressure relief valve. During
lunar surface activity, a failed relief valve would prevent further operation of
the suit.
TWX, Richard S. Johnston, MSC, to Hamilton Standard Division, Attn: R. E.
Breeding, June 17, 1965.
June 17
Officials from Bellcomm, MSFC, and the Apollo offices in Houston
and in Washington planned primary and alternate missions for the Saturn IB
(applicable to SA-201 through SA-208). On July 16, the Office of Manned Space
Flight specified launch vehicles (both Saturn IB and V hardware) for Apollo
missions.
NASA OMSF, Apollo Program Directive No. 4, "Apollo Controlled Milestones and
Hardware Quantities - Change Approval," July 16, 1965; memorandum, B. Kaskey,
Bellcomm, to File, "Apollo Alternate Missions Meeting, Case 217 (U)," June 22,
1965.
June 17
A Development Engineering Inspection (DEI) was held on
spacecraft 002 at North American, Downey, California. The NASA Board consisted
of W. M. Bland, Jr., Chairman; R. H. Ridnour, J. Chamberlin, S. A. Sjoberg, F.
J. Bailey, O. G. Morris, O. E. Maynard, and O. Tarango.
A total of 20 Request for Changes (RFCs) were submitted and reviewed; 12 of
them resulted from the design review conducted at MSC prior to the DEI, and
eight resulted from the inspection of the vehicle. The final disposition of the
RFCs was: seven approved for immediate action; five approved for study; three
rejected; and five determined not applicable.
Memorandum, W. M. Bland, Jr., MSC to Distr., "Results of Spacecraft 002
Development Engineering Inspection," sgd. E. M. Fields, June 23, 1965.
June 17
Crew Systems Division engineers evaluated various battery
combinations for the portable life support system. The division recommended a
three-hr main and a one-hr backup arrangement, which would save about 9 kg (20
lbs) in the total weight of the vehicle.
Memorandum, Richard S. Johnston, MSC, to Chief, Systems Engineering Division,
"PLSS battery sizing," June 17, 1965.
June 17-24
NASA representatives briefed officials from the Atomic Energy
Commission on the Apollo experiments program and discussed means of coordinating
the Commission's work on a radioisotope generator to power those experiments.
"ASPO Weekly Management Report, June 17-24, 1965."
June 17-24
Crew Systems Division began evaluating space suits for the
Apollo program (submitted by Hamilton Standard, David Clark, and International
Latex. (See July 8-15.)
Ibid.
June 21
North American's Rocketdyne Division conducted the 1,000th test
firing of the Saturn V's first-stage engine, the F-1, MSFC.
Space Business Daily, June 23, 1965, p. 275; History of
Marshall. . . January 1-December 31, 1965, p. 240.
June 21
Joseph F. Shea, ASPO Manager, established as a firm mission
requirement the capability to connect the space suit to the LEM's environmental
system and to the portable life support system while in a vacuum. This
capability was essential for operational flexibility on the moon's surface.
Memorandum, Joseph F. Shea, MSC, to Chief, Crew Systems Division, "Suit
Connections," June 21, 1965.
June 21
The following definitions were specified for use in evaluating
design reliability, for design tradeoff studies, and in appropriate Interface
Control Documentation:
- Mission success
- all primary mission objectives must have been accomplished and both the
crew and command module safely recovered.
- Alternate mission
- if a contingency prevented completion of all primary mission objectives,
but did not require immediate termination of the mission, an alternate mission
plan would be followed but alternate missions would not be included in design
reliability calculations.
- Abort
- the only objective after an abort decision was the safest recovery of the
crew considering the contingency which caused the abort.
Memorandum,
William A. Lee and Harry L. Reynolds, MSC, to Chief, Systems Engineering
Division, "Mission success and crew safety definitions," June 21, 1965.
June 21-July 1
Crew Systems Division (CSD) conducted a series of flight
tests to determine whether the cabin layout of the LEM was suitable for crew
performance in zero and one-sixth g environments. Together with its report of
satisfactory results, the division made several observations that it thought
"appropriate":
- CSD suggested hand grips in a number of places to aid the crew
- Additional restraints were needed to supplement the Velcro pile on the
cabin floor
- Some problems with crew performance and mobility, present during one-g
simulations, were absent in low- or zero-g environments (e.g., moving from one
crew station to another).
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, July
8-15, 1965."
June 22
MSC advised Grumman of additional functions for the computer in
the LEM's abort guidance section (to be added only if a part of its memory was
left over after the basic requirements were digested). These functions, in order
of priority, MSC listed as:
- Midcourse corrections
- Automatic abort from a coasting descent
- Display of CSM-LEM range and range rate
- Automatic terminal rendezvous (with manual velocity
control).
Letter, R. Wayne Young, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney,
"Contract NAS 9-1100, LEM Abort Guidance Section Functional Requirements," June
22, 1965.
June 22
NASA Headquarters established an Ad Hoc Surveyor Orbiter
Utilization Committee and MSC was requested to submit names of two proposed
members. It was suggested that the nominees be familiar with the mission
planning and constraints of the Apollo program. The first meeting was planned
for late July.
On July 29, MSC Director Robert R. Gilruth submitted the names of William A.
Lee and William E. Stoney, Jr. He noted that the same two individuals were being
nominated to serve as MSC members on the Apollo Site Selection Board. Gilruth
expressed a desire that the meetings of the two groups could be coordinated to
the extent that travel would be minimized.
Letter, Homer E. Newell, Associate Administrator for Space Science and
Applications, to MSC, Attn: Dr. Robert R. Gilruth, "Members of Ad Hoc
Surveyor/Orbiter Utilization Committee," June 22, 1965; letter, Gilruth to
Newell, "Members of Ad Hoc Surveyor/ Orbiter Utilization Committee," July 29,
1965.
June 23
In a memorandum concerning Configuration Control Panel and
Configuration Control Board actions, J. Thomas Markley, Chief of ASPO's Program
Control Division, pointed out that many proposals coming before the two groups
were not being adequately evaluated for program impact by the responsible
subsystem or technical area manager. He said, in part, "We must keep the number
of changes to a minimum and incorporate only those that are necessary to meet
program objectives. We are beyond the time when we can afford the luxury design
improvement changes, unless they can show substantial savings to the overall
program. . . ."
Memorandum, Markley to Distr., "CCB/CCP Actions," June 23, 1965.
June 23
The operational requirement for Block I and Block II CSM HE
orbital communications capability was investigated. ASPO requested that
appropriate contract direction and specification change notices be submitted
immediately to eliminate this capability from the Block II CSM and the
practicality of eliminating the HE orbital capability from the Block I CSM be
investigated.
Memorandum, William A. Lee, MSC, to Subsystem Manager, CSM Communications
Subsystem, "Requirement for Block I and Block II CSM HF Orbital Communications
Capability," June 23, 1965.
June 24-July 1
Dalmo-Victor submitted to MSC a report on modifications
necessary to extend to lunar distances the operating range of the CSM's
high-gain antenna. The Instrumentation and Electronic Systems Division was
reviewing the report.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, June 24-July 1, 1965."
June 24-July 1
MSC completed a cursory analysis of LEM landing gear
load-stroke requirements at touchdown velocities of 2.43 m (8 ft) per sec
vertical and 1.22 m (4 ft) per sec horizontal. This study was conducted to
determine the lowest crush loads at 8-4 velocity to which the gear could be
designed and still meet its landing performance requirements.
Ibid.; memorandum, William G. McMullen, MSC, to Manager, ASPO,
"Elimination of TM-5 vehicle from the LEM Landing Gear Subsystem Test Program,"
July 7, 1965.
June 25
NASA announced the appointment of Col. C. H. Bolender as Mission
Director for the first and second Apollo/Saturn IB flights. Bolender was
assigned to the Mission Operations Organization in the Office of Manned Space
Flight, NASA.
NASA News Release 65-211.
June 25
MSC approved North American's concept for thermal control of the
valves in the CM's reaction control system (essential for long-duration
missions). The crew could electrically heat the valves for about ten minutes
before CSM separation and before the system was pressurized, thereby
forestalling possible freezing of the oxidizer when it contacted the valve.
Letter, C. L. Taylor, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Systems Division,
Attn: J. C. Cozad, "Contract NAS 9-150, Effects of Spacecraft Venting Systems on
RCS Propellant Requirements, Determination of," June 23, 1965.
June 25
Harry L. Reynolds, Assistant Manager of ASPO, said it was
"becoming increasingly clear that we are going to have a difficult job keeping
the LEM weight below the control weight." He said the Grumman effort was not
adequate and suggested that R. Bullard of MSC be given LEM weight control as a
full-time responsibility.
Memorandum, Reynolds to Chief, Systems Engineering Division, "LEM Weight
Control," June 25, 1965.
June 25
ASPO informed Grumman, NAA, AC Spark Plug, and MIT that
effective June 21, 1965, General Electric Company, Apollo Support Department,
Daytona Beach, Fla., had assumed responsibility for the preparation and conduct
of all automatic checkout equipment (ACE) training for NASA and its contractors.
To satisfy conditions of its contract, General Electric would:
- Survey NASA and contractor ACE training requirements and prepare for ASPO
endorsement a standard set of lesson plans (course outlines) for three
distinct ACE training courses -
- for ACE operators and operational checkout procedures writers,
- for personnel who had site assignments but were not operators, and
- for all other individuals who did not satisfy the aforementioned
assignment considerations.
- Issue with ASPO approval a lesson plan for each ACE training course. These
plans would be considered baseline documents and deviations would not be
permitted without prior approval from ASPO.
- Prepare one study guide which would contain common reference information
for all three ACE training courses.
- Issue coordinated ACE training schedules approved by ASPO.
- Distribute monthly status reports to each participating organization.
'This report would contain a training schedule for the next three months as
well as a discussion of achievements. To control established plans and
implement changes, the coordinator for each participating organization would
be responsible for determining local training requirements and coordinating
those needs with other contractors or NASA elements who desired training at
that facility.
- Issue a citation which would acknowledge satisfactory course completion to
those qualifying students.
Purpose of selection of a single ACE
training contractor and establishment of a standard set of courses was to
provide participating organizations a sufficient amount of training and a
universal understanding of ACE.
Letters, R. Wayne Young, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, "Contract NAS
9-1100, ACE Training," June 25, 1965; M. E. Dell, MSC, to AC Spark Plug, Attn:
Hugh Brady, "Contract NAS 9-497, ACE Training," June 28, 1965; M. E. Dell, MSC,
to MIT, Attn: M. B. Trageser, "Contract NAS 9-4065, ACE Training," June 28,
1965; J. B. Alldredge, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Systems Division,
Attn: J. C. Cozad, "Contract NAS 9-150, ACE Training," June 29, 1965.
June 25
NASA announced negotiations with Douglas Aircraft Company for
nine additional S-IVB stages to be used as the third stage of the Saturn V
launch vehicle being developed at Marshall Space Flight Center. Work was to
include related spares and launch support services. The S-IVB contract,
presently valued at $312 million, would be increased by $150 million for the
additional work.
NASA News Release 65-209, "NASA to Negotiate with Douglas for more S-IVB
Stages," June 25, 1965; Space Business Daily, June 28, 1965, p.295.
June 25
MSC approved North American's proposed location of the antenna
for the radar transponder in the CSM, as well as the transponder's coverage.
This action followed a detailed review of the relative positions of the two
spacecraft during those mission phases when radar tracking of the LEM was
required.
Letter, R. Wayne Young, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, "Contract NAS
9-1100, Radar Transponder Antenna Location on CSM," June 25, 1965.
The first ground-test version of the Saturn V's first stage is shown
being removed from its vertical assembly tower at NASA's Michoud Operations
Facility June 27, 1965. The stage was 10 m (33 ft) in diameter and 42 m (138 ft)
tall.
June 28
Owen E. Maynard, Chief of the Systems Engineering Division,
vetoed a demand by the Flight Control Division for redundancy in the LEM's pulse
code modulation telemetry system. Two factors determined Maynard's action:
- cost and schedule impacts, and
- the resultant weight and power increases that redundancy would impose.
Also it would produce only a "marginal" increase in the total reliability of
the spacecraft.
Memorandum, Owen E. Maynard, MSC, to Chief, Flight
Control Division, "LEM PCM telemetry redundancy," June 28, 1965.
June 28
Systems Engineering Division chief, Owen E. Maynard, reported to
the Instrumentation and Electronic Systems Division (IESD) the results of a
study on a LEM communications problem (undertaken by his own group at IESD's
request). During phases of powered descent to certain landing sites (those in
excess of 20 degrees east or west longitude), the structure of the spacecraft
would block the steerable antenna's line of sight with the earth. Communications
with the ground would therefore be lost. Maynard concurred with IESD that the
problem could best be solved by rotating the LEM about its thrust axis.
Memorandum, Owen E. Maynard, MSC, to Chief, Instrumentation and Electronic
Systems Division, "Providing adequate earth coverage from the LEM S-band
steerable antenna during lunar descent and ascent," June 28, 1965.
June 28
John H. Disher, Director of the OMSF Apollo Test Office,
stressed two broad areas open to concern in the Apollo spacecraft heatshield
development program:
- structural integrity, and
- flight-test confirmation of the Block II design.
The structural
integrity question centered around the following problems: welding, ablative
material integrity, and impact strength.
MSC had planned to qualify the Block II heatshield by flight tests of
modified Block I spacecraft 017 and 020. Some of the Block II changes could not
be incorporated into modified Block I spacecraft in time to meet the current
schedule and limitations of facilities would not permit full evaluation of all
modifications by ground testing.
Disher suggested to Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips that ASPO
Manager Joseph Shea be asked to present physical descriptions of the Block I and
Block II heatshields, and interim versions as applied to specific spacecraft, as
well as the test plan that would ensure adequacy of heatshields to meet mission
requirements. Memorandum, Disher to Phillips, "Apollo Spacecraft Heat Shield,"
June 28, 1965.
MSC directed North American to design the CM to store one integrated thermal
meteoroid garment (TMG), rather than merely the thermal covering alone. The
crewmen would carry the TMG into the LEM for use during extravehicular
operations.
Letter, J, B. Alldredge, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Systems Division,
"Contract Change Authorization No. 371," June 29, 1965.
June 29
The launch of PA-2.
NASA launched Apollo mission PA-2, a test of the launch escape system (LES)
simulating a pad abort at WSMR. All test objectives were met. The escape rocket
lifted the spacecraft (boilerplate 23A) more than 1,524 m (5,000 ft) above the
pad. The earth landing system functioned normally, lowering the vehicle back to
earth. This flight was similar to the first pad abort test on November 7, 1963,
except for the addition of canards to the LES (to orient the spacecraft blunt
end forward after engine burnout) and a boost protective cover on the CM. PA-2
was the fifth of six scheduled flights to prove out the LES. [Mission objectives
in Appendix 5.]
Memorandum, George E. Mueller, NASA, to Administrator, "Apollo Spacecraft Pad
Abort Test, Mission PA-2, Post Launch Report No. 1," July 2, 1965; MSC,
"Postlaunch Report for Apollo Mission PA-2 (BP-23A)," July 29, 1965, pp. 1-1,
2-1, 3-1, and 10-1.
June 29
North American reported to MSC that no structural changes to the
spacecraft would be required for uprating the thrust of the Saturn IB's H-1
engine from 90,718 to 92,986 kg (200,000 to 205,000 lbs). Effects on the
performance of the launch escape vehicle would be negligible.
Letter, H. G. Osbon, NAA, to NASA MSC, Attn: C. L. Taylor, "Contract NAS
9-150, R&D for Project Apollo Spacecraft; Spacecraft Structural Impact of
Increase of H-1 Engine," June 29, 1965.
June 29
NASA formally announced the selection of six
scientist-astronauts for the Apollo program, chosen from a group nominated by
America's scientific community. Qualifications and recruiting procedures had
been worked out earlier by NASA and the National Academy of Sciences' Ad Hoc
Committee on Scientific Qualifications of Scientist-Astronauts. To be eligible,
candidates must have been born on or after August I, 1930; be citizens of the
United States; be no more than 1.83 m (6 ft) tall; and have an educational level
of a doctorate or the equivalent in experience. The six, only one of whom was on
active military service, were Owen K. Garriott, Edward G. Gibson, Duane E.
Graveline, Lt. Cdr. Joseph P. Kerwin (USN), Frank Curtis Michel, and Harrison
Schmitt.
Letter, Homer E. Newell, NASA, to Robert R. Gilruth, MSC, August 19, 1964,
with attachment, "Suggested Public Announcement of the Scientist-Astronaut
Program," August 19, 1964; letter, Newell to Harry H. Hess, NAS, August 19,
1964; NASA News Release 64-315, "NASA Reports Some 900 Persons Interested in
Scientist-Astronaut Program," December 16, 1964; MSC News Release 64-195,
December 16, 1964; MSC News Release 65-63, June 29, 1965.
June 30
Langley Research Center put into operation its 3.5 million Lunar
Landing Research Facility. The huge structure (76.2 m [250 ft] high and 121.9 m
[400 ft] long) would be used to explore techniques and to forecast various
problems of landing on the moon. The facility would enable a test vehicle to be
operated under one-sixth g conditions.
Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1965, p. 303; Michael David
Keller, Fifty Years of Flight Research: A Chronology of the Langley
Research Center, 1917-1966 (HHN-65), November 1966, p. 89.
June 30
In a memorandum to T. Tarbox, John Ryken, Bell Aerosystems
Company LLRV Project Manager, said he understood that Dean Grimm of MSC believed
that the LLRV was not configured to have the jet engine provide simulation of a
constant-lift rocket thrust in addition to providing the 5/6th g lift. Ryken
forwarded to Tarbox a copy of a report, "LLRV Automatic Control System Service
and Maintenance Manual," plus notes on the system in the hope that these would
help him and NASA personnel better understand the system. He also included
suggestions about reducing aerodynamic moments which Grimm felt might interfere
with LEM simulation.
Interoffice Memo, Bell Aerosystems Company, J. Ryken, Bell, to T. Tarbox,
Bell, "LLRV," June 30, 1965.
