PART 3 (C)
Lunar Orbit Rendezvous: Mode and Module
April 1962 through June 1962
1962
April
1962
May
1962
June
April 1-7
NAA was directed by the MSC Apollo Spacecraft Project Office
to begin a study to define the configuration and design criteria of the service
module which would make the lunar landing maneuver and touchdown.
Apollo Spacecraft Project Office, MSC, Weekly Activity Report, April 1-7,
1962.
April 2-3
A meeting to review the lunar orbit rendezvous (LOR) technique
as a possible mission mode for Project Apollo was held at NASA Headquarters.
Representatives from various NASA offices attended: Joseph F. Shea, Eldon W.
Hall, William A. Lee, Douglas R. Lord, James E. O'Neill, James Turnock, Richard
J. Hayes, Richard C. Henry, and Melvyn Savage of NASA Headquarters; Friedrich O.
Vonbun of Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC); Harris M. Schurmeier of Jet
Propulsion Laboratory; Arthur V. Zimmeman of Lewis Research Center; Jack Funk,
Charles W. Mathews, Owen E. Maynard, and William F. Rector of MSC; Paul J.
DeFries, Ernst D. Geissler, and Helmut J. Horn of Marshall Space Flight Center
(MSFC); Clinton E. Brown, John C. Houbolt, and William H. Michael, Jr., of
Langley Research Center; and Merrill H. Mead of Ames Research Center. Each phase
of the LOR mission was discussed separately.
The launch vehicle required was a single Saturn C-5, consisting of the S-IC,
S-II, and S-IVB stages. To provide a maximum launch window, a low earth parking
orbit was recommended. For greater reliability, the two-stage-to-orbit technique
was recommended rather than requiring reignition of the S-IVB to escape from
parking orbit.
The current concepts of the Apollo command and service modules would not be
altered. The lunar excursion vehicle (LEV), under intensive study in 1961, would
be aft of the service module and in front of the S-IVB stage. For crew safety,
an escape tower would be used during launch. Access to the LEV would be provided
while the entire vehicle was on the launch pad.
Both Apollo and Saturn guidance and control systems would be operating during
the launch phase. The Saturn guidance and control system in the S-IVB would be
"primary" for injection into the earth parking orbit and from earth orbit to
escape. Provisions for takeover of the Saturn guidance and control system should
be provided in the command module. Ground tracking was necessary during launch
and establishment of the parking orbit, MSFC and GSFC would study the altitude
and type of low earth orbit.
The LEV would be moved in front of the command module "early" in the
translunar trajectory. After the S-IVB was staged off the spacecraft following
injection into the translunar trajectory, the service module would be used for
midcourse corrections. Current plans were for five such corrections. If
possible, a symmetric configuration along the vertical center line of the
vehicle would be considered for the LEV. Ingress to the LEV from the command
module should be possible during the translunar phase. The LEV would have a
pressurized cabin capability during the translunar phase. A "hard dock"
mechanism was considered, possibly using the support structure needed for the
launch escape tower. The mechanism for relocation of the LEV to the top of the
command module required further study. Two possibilities were discussed:
mechanical linkage and rotating the command module by use of the attitude
control system. The S-IVB could be used to stabilize the LEV during this
maneuver.
The service module propulsion would be used to decelerate the spacecraft into
a lunar orbit. Selection of the altitude and type of lunar orbit needed more
study, although a 100-nautical-mile orbit seemed desirable for abort
considerations.
The LEV would have a "point" landing (±½ mile) capability. The landing site,
selected before liftoff, would previously have been examined by unmanned
instrumented spacecraft. It was agreed that the LEV would have redundant
guidance and control capability for each phase of the lunar maneuvers. Two types
of LEV guidance and control systems were recommended for further analysis. These
were an automatic system employing an inertial platform plus radio aids and a
manually controlled system which could be used if the automatic system failed or
as a primary system.
The service module would provide the prime propulsion for establishing the
entire spacecraft in lunar orbit and for escape from the lunar orbit to earth
trajectory. The LEV propulsion system was discussed and the general consensus
was that this area would require further study. It was agreed that the
propulsion system should have a hover capability near the lunar surface but that
this requirement also needed more study.
It was recommended that two men be in the LEV, which would descend to the
lunar surface, and that both men should be able to leave the LEV at the same
time. It was agreed that the LEV should have a pressurized cabin which would
have the capability for one week's operation, even though a normal LOR mission
would be 24 hours. The question of lunar stay time was discussed and it was
agreed that Langley should continue to analyze the situation. Requirements for
sterilization procedures were discussed and referred for further study. The time
for lunar landing was not resolved.
In the discussion of rendezvous requirements, it was agreed that two systems
be studied, one automatic and one providing for a degree of manual capability. A
line of sight between the LEV and the orbiting spacecraft should exist before
lunar takeoff. A question about hard-docking or soft-docking technique brought
up the possibility of keeping the LEV attached to the spacecraft during the
transearth phase. This procedure would provide some command module subsystem
redundancy.
Direct link communications from earth to the LEV and from earth to the
spacecraft, except when it was in the shadow of the moon, was recommended. Voice
communications should be provided from the earth to the lunar surface and the
possibility of television coverage would be considered.
A number of problems associated with the proposed mission plan were outlined
for NASA Center investigation. Work on most of the problems was already under
way and the needed information was expected to be compiled in about one month.
[This meeting, like the one held February 13-15, was part of a continuing
effort to select the lunar mission mode.]
Minutes, Lunar Orbit Rendezvous Meeting, April 2-3, 1962.
April 4
Two views of a preliminary mockup command module build by North
American's Space and Information Systems Division.
A mockup of the Apollo command module, built by the Space and Information
Systems Division of NAA, was made public for the first time during a visit to
NAA by news media representatives.
Oakley, Historical Summary, S&ID Apollo Program, p. 6.
April 5
The X-15 was flown to a speed of 2,830 miles per hour and to an
altitude of 179,000 feet in a test of a new automatic control system to be used
in the Dyna-Soar and Apollo spacecraft. NASA's Neil A. Armstrong was the pilot.
The previous electronic control system had been automatic only while the X-15
was in the atmosphere; the new system was automatic in space as well.
Baltimore Sun, April 6, 1962.
April 6
The Thiokol Chemical Corporation was selected by NAA to build
the solid-fuel rocket motor to be used to jettison the Apollo launch escape
tower following a launch abort or during a normal mission.
Oakley, Historical Summary, S&ID Apollo Program, p. 6.
April 6
The request for a proposal on the Little Joe II test launch
vehicle was submitted to bidders by a letter from MSC, together with a Work
Statement. Five launches, which were to test boilerplate models of the Apollo
spacecraft command module in abort situations, were called for: three in 1963
and two in 1964. The first two launches in 1963 were to be max q abort tests and
the third was to be a high-altitude atmospheric abort. The first launch in 1964
was to be a very-high-altitude abort and the final launch a confirming max
q abort [max q - the point in the exit trajectory at
which the launch vehicle and spacecraft are subjected to the severest
aerodynamic load]. (Evaluation of the proposals took place from April 23 to 27,
and the contractor was selected on May 11).
Apollo Spacecraft Project Office, MSC, Monthly Activity Report, April 1-30,
1962, p. 3; Little Joe II Test Launch Vehicle, NASA Project Apollo: Final
Report, Vol. I, pp 1-2, 4-1.
April 11
President John F, Kennedy designated the Apollo program
including essential spacecraft, launch vehicles, and facilities as being in the
highest national priority category (DX) for research and development and for
achieving operational capability.
National Security Action Memorandum No. 144, McGeorge Bundy to the Vice
President (as Chairman, National Aeronautics and Space Council); The Secretary
of Defense; the Secretary of Commerce; Administrator, NASA; Director, Bureau of
the Budget; Director, Office of Emergency Planning, "Assignment of Highest
National Priority to the APOLLO Manned Lunar Landing Program," April 11, 1962.
April 16
Representatives of MSC made a formal presentation at Marshall
Space Flight Center on the lunar orbit rendezvous technique for accomplishing
the lunar mission.
Apollo Spacecraft Project Office, MSC, Weekly Activity Report, April 15- 21,
1962.
April 19-20
Discussions at the monthly NAA-NASA Apollo spacecraft design
review included:
- Results of an NAA study on environmental control system (ECS) heating
capabilities for lunar night operations were presented. The study showed that
the system could not provide enough heating and that the integration of ECS
and the fuel cell coolant system was the most promising source for
supplemental heating.
- The launch escape system configuration was approved. It embodied a 120inch
tower, symmetrical nose cone, jettison motor located forward of the launch
escape motor, and an aerodynamic skirt covering the escape motor nozzles. This
configuration change in the escape rocket nozzle cant angle was intended to
prevent impingement of hot gases on the command module.
- MSC senior personnel directed NAA to study the technical penalties and
scheduling effects of spacecraft design capabilities with direct lunar landing
and lunar rendezvous techniques.
NAA, Apollo Monthly Progress
Report, SID 62-300-3, April 30, 1962, pp. 19, 59; Apollo Spacecraft
Project Office, MSC, Weekly Activity Report, April 15-21, 1962.
April 23
Ranger IV was launched by an Atlas-Agena B booster
from the Atlantic Missile Range, attained a parking orbit, and was fired into
the proper lunar trajectory by the restart of the Agena B engine. Failure of a
timer in the spacecraft payload caused loss of both internal and ground control
over the vehicle. The Goldstone Tracking Station maintained contact with the
spacecraft until it passed behind the left edge of the moon on April 26. It
impacted at a speed of 5,963 miles per hour, the first American spacecraft to
land on the lunar surface. The Agena B second stage passed to the right of the
moon and later went into orbit around the sun. Lunar photography objectives were
not achieved.
Astronautical and Aeronautical Events of 1962, pp. 59, 61;
New York Times, April 24, 1962; Washington Post, April
26, 1962.
April 24
Milton W. Rosen, NASA Office of Manned Space Flight Director of
Launch Vehicles and Propulsion, recommended that the S-IVB stage be designed
specifically as the third stage of the Saturn C-5 and that the C-5 be designed
specifically for the manned lunar landing using the lunar orbit rendezvous
technique. The S-IVB stage would inject the spacecraft into a parking orbit and
would be restarted in space to place the lunar mission payload into a translunar
trajectory. Rosen also recommended that the S- IVB stage be used as a flight
test vehicle to exercise the command module (CM), service module (SM), and lunar
excursion module (LEM) [previously referred to as the lunar excursion vehicle
(LEV)] in earth orbit missions. The Saturn C-1 vehicle, in combination with the
CM, SM, LEM, and S-IVB stage, would be used on the most realistic mission
simulation possible. This combination would also permit the most nearly complete
operational mating of the CM, SM, LEM, and S-IVB prior to actual mission flight.
MSF Management Council Minutes, April 24, 1962, Agenda Item 1.
April 24
MSC Associate Director Walter C. William reported to the Manned
Space Flight Management Council that the lack of a decision on the lunar mission
mode was causing delays in various areas of the Apollo spacecraft program,
especially the requirements for the portions of the spacecraft being furnished
by NAA.
MSF Management Council Minutes, April 24, 1962, Agenda Item 2.
April 24
The Manned Space Flight Management Council decided to delay the
awarding of a Nova launch vehicle study contract until July 1 at the earliest to
allow time for an in-house study of bids submitted and for further examination
of the schedule for a manned lunar landing using the direct ascent technique.
MSF Management Council Minutes, April 24, 1962, Agenda Item 4.
April 25
The Saturn SA-2 first stage booster was launched successfully
from Cape Canaveral. The rocket was blown up intentionally and on schedule about
2.5 minutes after liftoff at an altitude of 65 miles, dumping the water ballast
from the dummy second and third stages into the upper atmosphere. The
experiment, Project Highwater, produced a massive ice cloud and lightning-like
effects. The eight clustered H-1 engines in the first stage produced 1.3 million
pounds of thrust and the maximum speed attained by the booster was 3,750 miles
per hour. Modifications to decrease the slight fuel sloshing encountered near
the end of the previous flight test were successful.
New York Times, April 26, 1962; Astronautical and
Aeronautical Events of 1962, p.61.
April 30
The contract for the Apollo service module propulsion engine
was awarded by NAA to Aerojet-General Corporation. The estimated cost of the
contract was $12 million. NAA had given Aerojet-General authority April 9 to
begin work.
Apollo Quarterly Status Report No. 1, p. 19; MSC Space
News Roundup, May 2, 1962, p. 8; Aerojet-General Corporation,
Apollo Service Module Rocket Engine Monthly Progress Report,
October 1962, p. 1.
During the Month
John C. Houbolt of Langley Research Center, writing in
the April issue of Astronautics, outlined the advantages of lunar orbit
rendezvous for a manned lunar landing as opposed to direct flight from earth or
earth orbit rendezvous. Under this concept, an Apollo-type spacecraft would fly
directly to the moon, go into lunar orbit, detach a small landing craft which
would land on the moon and then return to the mother craft, which would then
return to earth. The advantages would be the much smaller craft performing the
difficult lunar landing and takeoff, the possibility of optimizing the smaller
craft for this one function, the safe return of the mother craft in event of a
landing accident, and even the possibility of using two of the small craft to
provide a rescue capability.
Houbolt, "Lunar-Orbit Rendezvous and Manned Lunar Landing,"
Astronautics, 7 (April 1962), pp.26-29, 70, 72.
During the Month
The basic design configuration of the command module
forward compartment was changed by the relocation of two attitude control
engines from the lower to the upper compartment area, where less heat flux would
be experienced during reentry.
Apollo Monthly Progress Report, SID 62-300-3, p. 79.
During the Month
Three major changes were made by NAA in the Apollo
space-suit circuit:
- The demand oxygen regulator was moved downstream of the crew to prevent a
sudden drop of pressure when a crewman opened his face plate.
- The suit manifold would now have a pressure-controlled bypass to prevent
variable flow to other crew members if one crewman increased or decreased
oxygen flow. The manifold would also include a venturi in each suit-inlet
connection to prevent a loss of oxygen flow to other crew members if the suit
of one crewman should rupture. In this situation, the venturi would prevent
the damaged suit flow out from exceeding the maximum flow of demand
regulators.
- The circuit water evaporator and coolant loop heat exchanger of the suit
were integrated into one by fluid exchange to make it smaller. A
coolant-temperature control was also provided for sunlight operation on the
moon.
In addition, a suit inlet-outlet was added to the command module
sleeping quarters, and the cabin fan was shifted so that it would operate as an
intake fan during the post-landing phase.
Apollo Monthly Progress Report, SID 62-300-3, pp. 17-18, 65.
During the Month
NAA developed a concept for shock attenuation along the
command module Y-Y axis by the use of aluminum honeycomb material.
Cylinders mounted on the outboard edge of the left and right couches would
extend mechanically to bear against the side compartment walls.
Apollo Monthly Progress Report, SID 62-300-3, p. 68.
During the Month
NAA studies resulted in significant changes in the
command module environmental control system (ECS).
- Among modifications in the ECS schematic were included:
- Reduction in the cooling water capacity
- Combining into one command module tank the potable water and cooling
water needed during boost
- Elimination of the water blanket for radiation protection.
- More water would be generated by the fuel cells than necessary and could
be dumped to decrease lunar landing and lunar takeoff weight.
- Airlock valving requirements would permit two or more crewmen to perform
extravehicular operation simultaneously. Area control of the space radiator to
prevent coolant freezing was specified.
- A new concept to integrate heat rejection from the spacecraft power system
and the ECS into one space radiator subsystem was developed. This subsystem
would provide full versatility for both lunar night and lunar day conditions
and would decrease weight and complexity.
- Because of the elimination of the lunar supplemental refrigeration system
and deployable radiators, the water-glycol coolant system was modified:
- Removal from the service module of the coolant loop regenerative heat
exchanger
- Replacement by a liquid valving arrangement of the gas-leak check
provision at the radiator panels
- Changeover to a completely cascaded system involving the suit-circuit
heat exchanger, cabin heat exchanger, and electronic component
coldplate.
In addition, a small, regenerative heat exchanger
was added in the command module to preheat the water-glycol. A separate coolant
branch to the inertial measurement unit section of the electronic system
provided for the more critical cooling task required in that area.
Apollo Monthly Progress Report, SID 62-300-3, pp. 15, 17, 21,
64-65.
During the Month
NAA determined that preliminary inflight nuclear
radiation instrumentation would consist of an onboard system to detect solar
x-ray or ultraviolet radiation and a ground visual system for telemetering solar
flare warning signals to the command module. The crew would have eight to ten
minutes warning to take protective action before the arrival of solar flare
proton radiation.
Apollo Monthly Progress Report, SID 62-300-3, p. 22.
A presentation on the lunar orbit rendezvous
technique was made to D. Brainerd Holmes, Director, NASA Office of Manned Space
Flight, by representatives of the Apollo Spacecraft Project Office. A similar
presentation to NASA Associate Administrator Robert C. Seamans, Jr., followed on
May 31.
Apollo Spacecraft Project Office, MSC, Monthly Activity Report, May 1-31,
1962.
May 4
The Source Evaluation Board for selecting Apollo navigation and
guidance components subcontractors completed its evaluation of bids and
technical proposals and submitted its findings to NASA Headquarters. Preliminary
presentation of the Board's findings had been made to NASA Administrator James
E. Webb on April 5.
Apollo Spacecraft Project Office, MSC, Weekly Activity Report, April 1- 7,
1962; MSC, Weekly Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Manned Space
Flight, April 29May 5, 1962, p. 12.
May 4-5
At the monthly Apollo spacecraft design review meeting at NAA,
MSC representatives recommended that NAA and Avco Corporation prepare a
comprehensive test plan for verifying the overall integrity of the heatshield
including flight tests deemed necessary, without regard for anticipated hunch
vehicle availability.
Apollo Spacecraft Project Office, MSC, Weekly Activity Report, June 3-9,
1962.
May 6
A preliminary Statement of Work for a proposed lunar excursion
module was completed, although the mission mode had not yet been selected.
MSC, Weekly Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Manned Space
Flight, April 29-May 5, 1962, p. 12.
May 3
A purchase request was being prepared by NASA for wind tunnel
support services from the Air Force's Arnold Engineering Development Center in
the amount of approximately $222,000. These wind tunnel tests were to provide
design parameter data on static stability, dynamic stability, pressure
stability, and heat transfer for the Apollo program. The funds were to cover
tests during June and July 1962. Approximately $632,000 would be required in
Fiscal Year 1963 to fund the tests scheduled to December 1962.
MSC, Weekly Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Manned Space
Flight, April 29-May 5, 1962, p. 13.
May 5
MSC processed a purchase request to increase NAA's spacecraft
letter contract from $32 million to $55 million to cover NAA's costs to June 30,
1962. [Pending the execution of a definitive contract (signed August 14, 1963),
actions of this type were necessary].
MSC, Weekly Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Manned Space
Flight, April 29-May 5, 1962, p. 13; Oakley, Historical Summary, S&ID
Apollo Program, p. 9.
May 8
NASA announced the selection of three companies for the
negotiation of production contracts for major components of the Apollo
spacecraft guidance and navigation system under development by the MIT
Instrumentation Laboratory. The largest of the contracts, for $16 million, would
be negotiated with AC Spark Plug Division of General Motor Corporation for
fabrication of the inertial, gyroscope-stabilized platform of the Apollo
spacecraft; for development and construction of ground support and checkout
equipment; and for assembling and testing all parts of the system. The second
contract, for $2 million, would be negotiated with the Raytheon Company to
manufacture the digital computer aboard the spacecraft. Under the third
contract, for about $2 million, Kollsman Instrument Corporation would build the
optical subsystems, including a space sextant, sunfinders, and navigation
display equipment.
Apollo Spacecraft Project Office, MSC, Weekly Activity Report, May 5-11,
1962; Washington Evening Star, May 9, 1962.
May 11
NASA awarded a letter contract to General Dynamics/Convair to
design and manufacture the Little Joe II test launch vehicle which would be used
to boost the Apollo spacecraft on unmanned suborbital test flights. The Little
Joe II would be powered by clustered solid-fuel engines. At the same time, a
separate 30-day contract was awarded to Convair to study the control system
requirements. White Sands Missile Range, N. Mex., had been selected for the
Little Joe II max q abort and high-altitude abort missions.
Apollo Spacecraft Project Office, MSC, Weekly Activity Report, May 13-19,
1962; Little Joe II Test Launch Vehicle, NASA Project Apollo: Final
Report, Vol. I, pp. 1-2, 4-1; Astronautical and Aeronautical Events
of 1962, p. 82.
May 24
The Aurora 7 spacecraft, with Astronaut M. Scott
Carpenter as pilot, was launched successfully by an Atlas booster from Atlantic
Missile Range. After a three-orbit flight, the spacecraft reentered the
atmosphere. Yaw error and late retrofire caused the landing impact point to be
over 200 miles beyond the intended area and beyond radio range of the recovery
forces. Landing occurred 4 hours and 56 minutes after liftoff. Astronaut
Carpenter was later picked up safely by a helicopter.
Grimwood, Project Mercury: A Chronology, pp. 164-165.
May 25
D. Brainerd Holmes, NASA's Director of Manned Space Flight,
requested the Directors of Launch Operations Center, Manned Spacecraft Center,
and Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) to prepare supporting component
schedules and cost breakdowns through Fiscal Year 1967 for each of the proposed
lunar landing modes: earth orbit rendezvous, lunar orbit rendezvous, and direct
ascent. For direct ascent, a Saturn C-8 launch vehicle was planned, using a
configuration of eight F-1 engines, eight J-2 engines, and one J-2 engine. MSFC
was also requested to submit a proposed schedule and summary of costs for the
Nova launch vehicle, using the configuration of eight F-1 engines, two M-1
engines, and one J-2 engine. Each Center was asked to make an evaluation of the
schedules as to possibilities of achievement, major problem areas, and
recommendations for deviations.
Memorandum, Holmes to Director, Launch Operations Center; Director, Manned
Spacecraft Center; and Director, Marshall Space Flight Center, "The Manned Lunar
Landing Program," May 25, 1962.
May 26
The F-1 engine was first fired at full power more than 1.5
million pounds of thrust) for 2.5 minutes at Edwards Rocket Site, Calif.
Rocketdyne Skywriter, June 1, 1962, p. 1.
May 29
A schedule for the letting of a contract for the development of a
lunar excursion module was presented to the Manned Space Flight Management
Council by MSC Director Robert R. Gilruth in anticipation of a possible decision
to employ the lunar rendezvous technique in the lunar landing mission.
MSF Management Council Minutes, May 29, 1962, Agenda Item 12.
May 29
The Manned Space Flight Management Council approved the mobile
launcher concept for the Saturn C-5 at Launch Complex 39, Merritt Island, Fla.
MSF Management Council Minutes, May 29, 1962, Agenda Item 9.
During the Month
NAA completed a preliminary requirement outline for
spacecraft docking. The outline specified that the two spacecraft be navigated
to within a few feet of each other and held to a relative velocity of less than
six inches per second and that they be steered to within a few inches of axial
alignment and parallelism. The crewman in the airlock was assumed to be
adequately protected against radiation and meteoric bombardment and to be able
to grasp the docking spacecraft and maneuver it to the sealing faces for final
clamp.
NAA, Apollo Monthly Progress Report, SID 62-300 4, May 31, 1962,
p. 66.
During the Month
A feasibility study was completed by NAA on the
ballistic (zero-lift) maneuver as a possible emergency flight mode for lunar
mission reentry. Based upon single-pass and 12 g maximum load-factor criteria,
the guidance corridor would be nine nautical miles. When atmospheric density
deviations were considered (+/- 50 percent from standard), the allowable
corridor would be reduced to four nautical miles. Touchdown dispersions within
the defined corridor exceeded 2500 nautical miles.
Apollo Monthly Progress Report, SID 62-300-4, p. 17.
During the Month
Telescope requirements for the spacecraft were modified
after two study programs had been completed by NAA.
A study on the direct vision requirement for lunar landing showed that, to
have a simultaneous direct view of the lunar landing point and the landing feet
without changing the spacecraft configuration, a periscope with a large field of
view integrated with a side window would be needed. A similar requirement on the
general-purpose telescope could thus be eliminated, reducing the complexity of
the telescope design.
Another study showed that, with an additional weight penalty of from five to
ten pounds, an optical drift indicator for use after parachute deployment could
easily be incorporated into the general-purpose telescope.
Apollo Monthly Progress Report, SID 62-300-4, pp. 29-30.
During the Month
The first reliability prediction study for the Apollo
spacecraft was completed by NAA. Assuming all systems as series elements and
excluding consideration of alternative modes, redundancies, or inflight
maintenance provisions, the study gave a reliability estimate of 0.731. This
analysis provided a basis from which means of improving reliability would be
evaluated and formulated.
Apollo Monthly Progress Report, SID 62-300-4, p. 26.
During the Month
Layouts of three command module observation window
configurations were made by NAA. A study disclosed that sufficient direct vision
for lunar landing was not feasible and that windows could not be uncovered
during reentry.
Apollo Monthly Progress Report, SID 62-300-4, p. 66.
During the Month
NAA began compiling a list of command module materials
to be classified selectively for potentially toxic properties. These materials
would be investigated to determine location (related to possible venting of
gases), fire resistance, exposure to excessive temperatures, gases resulting
from thermal decomposition, and toxicity of gases released under normal and
material-failure conditions. Although a complete examination of every material
was not feasible, materials could be grouped according to chemical constituency
and quantity of gases released.
Apollo Monthly Progress Report, SID 62-300-4, p. 10,
During the Month
The basic spacecraft adapter structure was defined as
consisting of six aluminum honeycomb panels, six longerons, and forward and aft
bulkheads. The design of the honeycomb panels for the test requirements program
was complete.
Apollo Monthly Progress Report, SID 62-300-4. v. 89.
During the Month
NAA decided to retain the inward-opening pull-down
concept for the spacecraft crew hatch, which would use plain through bolts for
lower sill attachment and a manual jack-screw device to supply the force
necessary to seat and unseat the hatch.
Concurrently, a number of NAA latching concepts were in preparation for
presentation to NASA, including that of an outward-opening, quick- opening crew
door without an outer emergency panel. This design, however, had weight and
complexity disadvantages, as well as requiring explosive charges.
Apollo Monthly Progress Report, SID 62-300-4, p. 68.
During the Month
The command module reaction control system (RCS)
selected by NAA was a dual system without interconnections. Either would be
sufficient for the entire mission.
For the service module RCS, a quadruple arrangement was chosen which was
basically similar to the command module RCS except that squib valves and burst
discs were eliminated.
Apollo Monthly Progress Report, SID 62-300-4, p. 84.
During the Month
NAA evaluated the possibility of integrating the fuel
cell and environmental control system heat rejection into one system. The
integrated system proved to be unsatisfactory, being 300 pounds heavier and
considerably more complex than the two separate systems. A preliminary design of
separate fuel cell radiators, possibly located on the service module, was
started by NAA.
Apollo Monthly Progress Report, SID 62-300-4, p. 82.
During the Month
NAA studies on the prototype crew couch included one on
the use of the center couch for supporting a crewman at the astrosextant during
lunar approach and another on the displacement of outboard couches for access to
equipment areas.
Apollo Monthly Progress Report, SID 62-300-4, p. 65.
During the Month
Two NAA analyses showed that the urine management
system would prevent a rise in the command module humidity load and atmospheric
contamination and that freeze-up of the line used for daily evacuation of urine
to the vacuum of space could be prevented by proper orificing of the line.
Apollo Monthly Progress Report, SID 62-300-4, pp. 10-11
Wernher von Braun, Director, Marshall Space
Flight Center, recommended to the NASA Office of Manned Space Flight that the
lunar orbit rendezvous mode be adopted for the lunar landing mission. He also
recommended the development of an unmanned, fully automatic, one-way Saturn C-5
logistics vehicle in support of the lunar expedition; the acceleration of the
Saturn C-1B program; the development of high-energy propulsion systems as a
backup for the service module and possibly the lunar excursion module; and
further development of the F-1 and J-2 engines to increase thrust or specific
impulse.
"Concluding Remarks by Dr. Wernher von Braun about Mode Selection for the
Lunar Landing Program Given to Dr. Joseph F. Shea, Deputy Director (Systems),
Office of Manned Space Flight, June 7, 1962," undated.
June 10-11
NAA was directed by the Apollo Spacecraft Project Office at
the monthly design review meeting to design an earth landing system for a
passive touchdown mode to include the command module cant angle limited to about
five degrees and favoring offset center of gravity, no roll orientation control,
no deployable heatshield, and depressurization of the reaction control system
propellant prior to impact. At the same meeting, NAA was requested to use a
single "kicker" rocket and a passive thrust-vector-control system for the
spacecraft launch escape system.
Apollo Spacecraft Project Office, MSC, Weekly Activity Report, June 8-1 4, 1
962.
June 16
NASA announced that the Apollo service module propulsion system
would be tested at a new facility at White Sands Missile Range, N. Mex.
Oakley, Historical Summary, S&ID Apollo Program, p. 7.
June 16-22
Results of a preliminary investigation by NAA showed that a
100 percent oxygen atmosphere for the command module would save about 30 pounds
in weight and reduce control complexity.
NASA-Resident Apollo Spacecraft Project Office, NAA, Weekly Activity Report
for Week Ending June 22, 1962, p. 3.
June 18
As the result of considerable joint engineering effort and
discussion by NAA and MIT Instrumentation Laboratory, the location of the
onboard space sextant in the command module was changed from the main instrument
panel to the wall of the lower equipment bay. The instrument would penetrate the
hull on the hot side during reentry and the navigator would have to leave his
couch to make navigation sightings and to align the inertial measurement unit.
David G. Hoag, personal notes, June 18, 1962.
June 22
MSC Director Robert R. Gilruth reported to the Manned Space
Flight Management Council that the selection of the ablative material for the
Apollo spacecraft heatshield would be made by September 1. The leading contender
for the forebody ablative material was an epoxy resin with silica fibers for
improving char strength and phenolic microballoons for reducing density.
In addition, Gilruth noted that a reevaluation of the Saturn C-1 and C-1B
launch capabilities appeared to indicate that neither vehicle would be able to
test the complete Apollo spacecraft configuration, including the lunar excursion
module. Complete spacecraft qualification would require the use of the Saturn
C-5.
MSF Management Council Minutes, June 22, 1962, Agenda Item 2.
June 22
Joseph F. Shea, NASA Deputy Director of Manned Space Flight
(Systems), presented to the Manned Space Flight Management Council the results
of the study on lunar mission mode selection. The study included work by
personnel in Shea's office, MSC, and Marshall Space Flight Center. The criteria
used in evaluating the direct ascent technique, earth orbit rendezvous
connecting and fueling modes, and lunar orbit rendezvous were: the mission
itself, weight margins, guidance accuracy, communications and tracking
requirements, reliability (abort problems), development complexity, schedules,
costs, flexibility, growth potential, and military implications.
MSF Management Council Minutes, June 22, 1962, Agenda Item 12.
June 22
After an extended discussion, the Manned Space Flight Management
Council unanimously decided:
- Lunar orbit rendezvous, using the Saturn C-5 launch vehicle, should be the
mission mode for lunar exploration.
- The development of a lunar logistics vehicle, using the Saturn C-1B or the
C-5 launch vehicle, should be started and a six-month study of this
development should begin immediately.
- Time was too short and the expense too great to develop a parallel backup
mode.
- Study of the Nova vehicle should continue with the expectation that its
development would follow the C-5 by two or three years.
- The C-1B launch vehicle should be started immediately, looking toward the
first two-stage flight in mid- 1965.
- Development of a lunar excursion module should begin at once.
These
decisions were to be presented to NASA Associate Administrator Robert C.
Seamans, Jr., NASA Deputy Administrator Hugh L. Dryden, and NASA Administrator
James E. Webb for approval.
MSF Management Council Minutes, June 22, 1962, Agenda Item 12.
June 30
A thermal coverall for use in extravehicular space suit design
was completed in-house and would be shipped to Vought Astronautics for use in
the MSC evaluation contract.
MSC, Weekly Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Manned Space
Flight, June 24-30, 1962.
During the Month
Five NASA scientists, dressed in pressure suits,
completed an exploratory study at Rocketdyne Division of the feasibility of
repairing, replacing, maintaining, and adjusting components of the J-2 rocket
while in space. The scientific team also investigated the design of special
maintenance tools and the effectiveness of different pressure suits in
performing maintenance work in space.
Rocketdyne Skywriter, July 13, 1962.
Summer-Fall
NASA and MIT agreed that the Instrumentation Laboratory
would use the microcircuit for the prototype Apollo onboard computer. The
Fairchild Controls Corporation microcircuit was the only one available in the
United States.
Interview with Ralph Ragan, Instrumentation Laboratory, MIT, April 27, 1966.
