Part 3 (A)
Man Circles the Moon, the Eagle Lands, and Manned Lunar Exploration
October 23, 1968 through November 1968
1968
October 23
LeRoy E. Day, Apollo Test Director, NASA Hq., informed Apollo
Program Director Samuel C. Phillips of two failures of LM propellant tanks
during testing, a problem that might have significant program impact on LMs 6
and 7 and subsequent vehicles. The particular tanks in question were those
manufactured by Allison Division of General Motors but reworked under separate
contract by Airite Division of Sargent Industries. The two tanks, lightweight
SWIP II models slated for LM-6 and subsequent vehicles, had suffered small
cracks in the welds. So far, said Day, the weld process used in manufacture of
the tanks was "highly suspect." Cryogenic proof-testing probably would be
required to validate the tanks and to give confidence in the tank welds.
Meantime, he said, the problem was receiving high-level attention both at
Grumman and in Houston.
Memo, Day to Apollo Program Director, "LM Descent Propellant Tank Failures,"
Oct. 23, 1968.
October 24
Howard D. Burns, Chief of the Saturn V Test Management Office
at MSFC, sent to Apollo launch operations officials at KSC a list of
requirements for retesting the Saturn V following a lightning strike on the
vehicle while on the pad. These requirements were to be included in the next
revision of the overall test and checkout requirements documents at KSC. (Burns'
action came largely as a result of discussions at the AS-503 Crew Safety Review
Board meeting at KSC on August 20-21, 1968.) Burns recommended that KSC prepare
a contingency plan specifying various stage and launch vehicle test and checkout
procedures that would satisfy MSFC's requirements. The most immediate assessment
must be the overall safety of the launch vehicle. Electronic and electrical
components headed the list of specific hardware systems to be assessed.
Ltr., Burns to KSC, Attn: A. G. Smith, "AS-503-10 Launch Vehicle Test and
Retest Requirements Following a Lightning Strike on the Saturn V Launch
Vehicle/LUT/MSS," Oct. 24, 1968, with encl., same subj.
October 26
In a memorandum for the record, MSC's Apollo LM Program
Manager C. H. Bolender reviewed results of the receiving inspection performed on
LM-4 at KSC on October 21. Only 59 valid "crabs" were reported, 44 of them by
Grumman's receiving personnel. None of the discrepancies noted involved major
hardware damage or serious procedural faults. Significant progress had been made
in reducing receiving discrepancies between LM-3 and LM-4. This improvement
Bolender attributed to the addition of surveillance inspectors at Grumman and to
the emphasis being placed on quality control by the resident ASPO personnel at
Bethpage.
Memo for Record, Bolender, "Review of LM-4 Receiving Inspection at KSC," Oct.
26, 1968.
October 28
MSC Apollo Spacecraft Program Office Manager George M. Low
deleted the requirement for a short static-firing of the Apollo 8 service module
reaction control system on the pad before launch (the so-called "burp" firing).
He took this move in line with a recommendation from NASA Apollo Program
Director Samuel C. Phillips and in light of the nominal performance of the RCS
during the Apollo 7 flight. By thus eliminating the burp firings -
and not allowing any contact of the system's hypergolic propellants - the
spacecraft could be maintained in a loaded condition through the December and
January launch windows and gain the maximum launch flexibility for the Apollo 8
flight. (Decisions not to static-fire the RCS systems on spacecraft following
103 had been made some time earlier.)
TWX, Phillips to Low, "Apollo 8 Pre-Launch Burp Firing," Oct. 25, 1968; ltr.,
Low to Phillips, Oct. 28, 1968.
October 31
NASA Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips officially
designated the AS-504 and AS-505 missions as Apollo 9 and Apollo 10.
TWX, Phillips, NASA Hq., to KSC, MSFC, and MSC, "Apollo Mission
Designations," Oct. 31.
November 7
The Configuration Control Board had decided in favor of an
informal crew log for each Apollo spacecraft, ASPO Manager George M. Low
informed MSC Director of Flight Crew Operations Donald K. Slayton. The log would
be an unofficial document kept by consulting pilots at the spacecraft contractor
plants during checkout and test of the vehicles and by the flight crew support
team at KSC. Although not intended to replace other, more formal procedures for
recording hardware discrepancies, the log would contain such items as switching
anomalies, meter bias, and what Low termed "bona fide 'ghosts'" which had no
reasonable engineering explanation, as well as audible and visual
"idiosyncrasies" in spacecraft operation.
Memo, Low to Slayton, "Spacecraft crew log," Nov. 7, 1968.
November 8
ASPO Manager George M. Low asked Rocco A. Petrone, Launch
Operations Director at KSC, to set up a special task team to review all
paperwork and to inspect visually all hardware, to ensure proper spacecraft
deployment during the Apollo 8 flight. Apollo 8 contained a novel set of
mechanical and electrical interfaces (CSM, LTA-B lunar module dummy, launch
adapter, and Saturn V vehicle), Low observed. Furthermore, concern about these
complex interfaces had increased because one of the adapter panels on
Apollo 7 had not opened properly. What Low - as well as MSC
Director Robert R. Gilruth - desired foremost was to preclude repetition of
another situation such as had occurred during the Gemini IX
mission, when the shroud panels covering the Agena target vehicle had only
partially deployed and had produced the "angry alligator" that forced
cancellation of docking plans on that earlier flight.
Ltr., Low to Petrone, Nov. 8, 1968.
November 12
The Apollo Crew Safety Review Board met to assess land
landing of the CSM in the area of the launch site if a flight were aborted just
before launch or during the initial phase of a flight. In general the Board was
satisfied with overall planned recovery and medical operations. The only
specific item to be acted on was some means of purging the interior of the
spacecraft to expel any coolant or propellant fumes that might be trapped inside
the cabin. The Board was also concerned about the likelihood of residual
propellants trapped inside the vehicle even after abort sequence purging, a
problem that MSC secured assistance from both the Ames and Lewis Research
Centers to solve. At the Board's suggestion, MSC's Crew Systems Division also
investigated the use of a helmet liner for the astronauts to prevent head injury
upon impact. Finally, the Board recommended continued egress training with fully
suited crews, including some night training.
Memo, David B. Pendley, MSC Flight Control Div., to ASPO Manager, "Land
landing in the launch site area," Nov. 18, 1968.
November 13
ASPO Manager Low asked Aaron Cohen, one of his staff
assistants, to lead an investigation to determine detrimental effects of
moisture on the strength of the bonded covering of the launch adapter structure.
His action stemmed directly from a presentation the same day by James A.
Chamberlin to the Structures Advisory Board explaining the adapter failure on
Apollo 6. Moisture in the adapter not only raised the pressures
generated by heating during the boost phase of the flight through the
atmosphere, but it also weakened the structural bonding either directly or by
hampering venting through the holes in the honeycomb material. Low asked Cohen
to take precautions that no water be allowed to enter the adapter. All joints in
the material should be sealed with a waterproof tape even before the countdown
demonstration test and should remain on the vehicle throughout the flight, so
that the adapter would absorb no moisture even if it rained during the final
count before launch. On the other hand, the tape must then withstand boost phase
heating and must not impair spacecraft separation and panel jettisoning. (North
American Rockwell, in compliance with CCBD, August 10, 1968, Master Change
Record 7727, modified the SLA panels by drilling vent holes in the inner skin of
the panels of all subsequent SLAs to allow release of moisture during ascent.
These holes were to be kept sealed until immediately before launch to avoid
collection of moisture in the honeycomb.)
Memo, Low to Cohen, "Verification of spacecraft/LM adapter," Nov. 13, 1968.
November 19
Martin L. Raines, MSC's Manager at the White Sands Test
Facility, recommended to ASPO Manager George M. Low that he issue official
direction to the two spacecraft contractors, North American Rockwell and
Grumman, governing the phasedown of operations at the engine test site. Early
action was needed, Raines said, for proper contractual action on the phasedown
and for proper disposition of equipment and supplies. This action signaled the
end of the long and difficult supportive development effort to prove out the
Apollo spacecraft rocket engines for flight.
Memo, Raines to ASPO Manager, "WSTF Phasedown Plan," Nov. 19, 1968.
November 22
Howard W. Tindall, Jr., Chief of Apollo Data Priority
Coordination within ASPO, reported an operational system problem aboard the LM.
To give a returning Apollo crew an indication of time remaining to perform a
landing maneuver or to abort, a light on the LM instrument panel would come on
when about two minutes worth of propellants remained in the descent propellant
system tanks with the descent engine running at 25-percent thrust. The present
LM weight and descent trajectory were such that the light would always come on
before touchdown. The only hitch, said Tindall, was that the signal was
connected to the spacecraft master alarm. "Just at the most critical time in the
most critical operation of a perfectly nominal lunar landing mission, the master
alarm with all its lights, bells, and whistles will go off." Tindall related
that some four or five years earlier, astronaut Pete Conrad had called the
arrangement "completely unacceptable . . . but he was probably just an Ensign at
the time and apparently no one paid any attention." If this "is not fixed,"
Tindall said, "I predict the first words uttered by the first astronaut to land
on the moon will be 'Gee whiz, that master alarm certainly startled me.'"
Tindall recommended either rerouting the signal wiring to bypass the alarm or
cutting the signal wire and relying solely on the propellant gauges to assess
flight time remaining.
Memo to distr., Tindall, "LM DPS low level light fixing," Nov. 22, 1968.
November 22
In a memorandum for the record, ASPO Manager George M. Low
summarized results of November 19 and 22 meetings on procedures for astronaut
training runs with the Apollo extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) under simulated
space conditions. The runs would be in the two vacuum test chambers of the
Center's Space Environment Simulation Laboratory. MSC Director Robert R. Gilruth
had attended the meetings. Training runs were always to be preceded by a run
also under altitude conditions and using a gas umbilical from the life support
system of the facility itself. Although connected to the crewman, the facility
umbilical would not be used as a gas supply under normal test conditions. For
the final training run, the astronaut would wear a complete flight-configured
EMU without any other link with the facility. Although several participants
objected that training runs using the EMU alone ran greater risk than normal in
chamber tests, the decision to conduct the exercises using the all-up flight
configuration was reaffirmed.
Memo for Record, Low, "EMU activities in the SESL," Nov. 22, 1968.
November 22
NASA Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight George
E. Mueller reviewed for NASA Acting Administrator Thomas O. Paine the
development of the Apollo service propulsion system (SPS) engine. (Earlier,
Paine had asked whether the SPS engine had ever failed to fire during all of
this developmental program.) Mueller reported that a review of the test history
showed that no complete flight-configuration engine had ever failed to fire. In
fact, during the entire development program (comprising some 3,200 engine starts
and more than 90,000 seconds of firing time ) only four engines had failed to
start. In all of these cases, the cause of the ignition failures could be traced
to faulty ground support equipment or to inadequate or improper operational
procedures. No engine failure could be attributed solely to the SPS engine
itself. Mueller's response to Paine - with obvious overtones for the upcoming
Apollo 8 circumlunar mission - bespoke a supreme confidence in the safety and
reliability of the all-important main engine of the spacecraft.
Memo, Mueller to Acting Administrator, "Response to Question on Apollo
Service Propulsion System Engine," Nov. 22, 1968.
November 27
The LM-11 midsection assembly collapsed in the assembly jig
during the bulkhead prefitting stage of construction at Grumman. The structure
buckled when the bulkheads, which had just been prefitted and drilled, were
removed to permit deburring the drilled holes. Jig gates that were supposed to
hold up the assembly were not in position, nor was the safety line properly
installed. The structure was supported by hand. Damage to the skin of the
structure was not severe, although a small radius bend was put in one of the
upper skins.
Memo, Samuel A. Gentile, Bethpage RASPO Contracting Officer, to distr.,
"Report of Damage of LM-11 Midsection Assembly during Manufacturing Phase, this
date," Nov. 27, 1968.
November 27
The need to flight-test manual control of the light LM
ascent configuration had been discussed at the October 15 MSC Flight Program
Review, MSC Director Robert R. Gilruth informed NASA Apollo Program Director
Samuel C. Phillips. There was an implication that a control problem could exist
for this configuration. Gilruth said he had stated that MSC should be able to
establish manual control handling qualities of the LM through proper simulation
and be confident about the adequacy of the control system.
Subsequently, Gilruth had reviewed the operating characteristics of the LM
control system and the status of the simulation program related to manual
control of the light ascent stage during docking. He said that the most
demanding requirement for precision manual attitude control was the docking
maneuver. Docking control had been simulated extensively at MSC, Grumman, and
LaRC using functional representation of the control system and these simulations
established the capability of docking the LM well within the specified docking
criteria. In addition, other LM control tasks had been simulated at MSC and
Grumman, and the LM was found to have satisfactory handling qualities for all
manual control tasks.
Ltr., Gilruth to Phillips, "Manual Control of the Light Lunar Module Ascent
Configuration," Nov. 27, 1968.
