Part 2 (O)
Recovery, Spacecraft Redefinition, and First Manned Apollo Flight
October 1 through October 21, 1968
1968
October 1-2
The Apollo Crew Safety Review Board held its fourth meeting
at MSC. Discussions centered chiefly on Saturn V engine-out abort situations and
the ability of the CSM to withstand structural loads imposed by such vehicle
failures. In fact, however, it was unlikely that any problem would be
experienced, because of a controlled S-IC engine shutdown. Loads because of
catastrophic engine failure greatly exceeded spacecraft capability, but the
Board ruled such an occurrence as remote and accepted it as a flight risk. Also,
evaluation of testing results demonstrated that overall loads because of pogo
vibration were not a problem. Board Chairman William C. Schneider reported that,
in general, action items assigned to MSC as a result of the Apollo 7 review had
been satisfactorily closed.
Ltr., Schneider to distr., "Minutes of Fourth Meeting on October 1-2, 1968,
at the Manned Spacecraft Center," Oct. 11, 1968.
October 2
George E. Mueller, NASA Associate Administrator for Manned
Space Flight, wrote MSC Director Robert R. Gilruth to reemphasize the
operational philosophy for the Apollo 7 mission. That flight, Mueller said, was
the first in the manned program - including Mercury and Gemini programs - to
employ fully the "open ended" mission concept. Rather than the Gemini process,
in which a series of missions verified the spacecraft design for 3, 6, and
ultimately 14 days, with Apollo 7 the first flight was to verify the CSM,
evaluating the vehicle via telemetry through each successive mission step. Also,
to ensure maximum return from the mission, primary and secondary objectives
would be completed as early in the flight as possible (approximately two-thirds
of those objectives to be completed by the end of the first day and more than 90
percent by end of the second day). Mueller emphasized the importance of the
agency's emphasizing this open-ended mission concept during public announcements
of Apollo 7's flight plan and objectives.
Ltr., Mueller to Gilruth, Oct. 2, 1968.
October 3
Senior management from NASA Hq. and the three manned Centers
conducted the Apollo 7 flight readiness review at KSC. Crew, space vehicle, and
all supporting elements were ready for flight. Countdown-to-launch sequence had
started on October 6, and flight preparations were on schedule for launch
readiness at 11:00 a.m. EDT on October 11.
OMSF, NASA Hq., to NASA Administrator and Deputy Administrator, "Manned Space
Flight Weekly Report - October 7, 1968," Oct. 7, 1968.
October 4
MSC spacecraft and mission planning experts met to discuss
mission techniques for the D mission, specifically the rendezvous exercise.
Because of the slow progress in reviewing a draft of the D Rendezvous Mission
Techniques document, Apollo Data Priority Coordinator Howard W. Tindall reported
that the Center's effort in this area needed to be strengthened. Participants
did identify exactly what spacecraft equipment had to be working at the start of
each segment of the rendezvous exercise. A general principle was that the CSM
must at all times be prepared to rescue the LM. Participants therefore insisted
on having a redundant capability in the CSM for all crucial operations. This
rescue capability by the CSM provided an adequate backup for each possible LM
system failure except braking. This general philosophy, stated Tindall, "seemed
to provide the best tradeoff between crew safety and assurance of meeting
mission objectives." Memo, Tindall to distr., "D Rendezvous Mission Techniques,"
Oct. 10, 1968.
October 7
In preparation for the flight of Apollo 8, NASA and industry
technicians at KSC placed CSM 103 atop the Saturn V launch vehicle. The launch
escape system was installed the following day; and on October 9 the complete
AS-503 space vehicle was rolled out of the Vehicle Assembly Building and moved
to the launch pad, where launch preparations were resumed.
Memo, George E. Mueller, NASA Associate Administrator for Manned Flight, to
Acting NASA Administrator, "Manned Space Flight Weekly Report - October 14,
1968," Oct. 14, 1968.
October 7
Ralph H. Tripp, LM Program Manager at Grumman, forwarded his
company's plan for control of configuration changes on the LM. The need for such
a formal statement had been discussed at a meeting in Bethpage on September 25
between ASPO Manager George M. Low; his deputy for the LM, C. H. Bolender; other
Apollo engineers from Houston; and Tripp, LM Program Director Joseph G. Gavin,
Jr., and others from Grumman. Grumman's ground rules set forth explicit
guidelines governing change approval levels, specifically those changes which
the contractor might make without obtaining prior specific approval from NASA
(defined as "compatibility changes" that did not have significant cost, weight,
performance, schedule, or safety effects) - although Grumman must continue to
inform MSC of these changes as they occurred.
Ltr., Tripp to Low, "Configuration Change Control, LM Program," Oct. 7, 1968,
with encl., "Configuration Change Control - Ground Rules," Oct. 7, 1968.
October 7
In compliance with Apollo Program Directive 29 of July 6,
1967, ASPO Manager George M. Low informed Apollo Program Director Samuel C.
Phillips that "the private umbilical connection between the astro- communicator
and the astronauts, the private administrative telephone connection via the
umbilical cable to the astronauts, and the private aeromed communications in the
MSOB [Manned Spacecraft Operations Building] will be recorded during all
hazardous spacecraft tests. The recording will be placed in the hands of the
Director of Flight Crew Operations, who will keep this recording for a period of
30 days following mission completion. After that time the recording may be
destroyed."
Ltr., Low to Phillips, Oct. 7, 1968; TWX, Phillips to Low, "Recording of
Voice Communications at KSC," Sept. 30, 1968.
October 9
Members of the MSF Management Council considered scientific
experiments and surface extravehicular activities (EVA) for the first Apollo
lunar landing mission. They decided to go ahead with development of three
proposed experiments, the passive seismometer, laser reflector, and solar wind
collector. They made no commitment to fly any of the three, however, pending
development schedules and a clear understanding of timelines required for their
deployment during the EVA portion of the mission. Other issues examined by the
Council still were unresolved: one versus two-man EVA, use of television, and
timeline allocations for EVA trials and development by the crew. During the
discussions, ASPO Manager George M. Low recommended attempting television
transmission via the Goldstone antenna (although the operational procedures
would further burden an already heavily constrained mission). The erectable
antenna would also be carried and used if the landing site and EVA period
precluded sight of the Goldstone antenna. Charles W. Mathews and others from
Washington voiced concern that the EVA timeline did not allow sufficient time
for learning about EVA per se in the one-sixth-gravity environment of the moon.
The astronaut must perform some special tasks, but must also have some time for
personal movements and evaluation of EVA capabilities in order to build
confidence toward a fairly complex EVA exercise during the second landing
mission. Low asked his chief system engineering assistant, Owen E. Maynard, to
incorporate these operational decisions into the Apollo mission planning and to
define mounting of the television camera and its early use in the mission.
Memo, Low to Maynard, "First G mission science package," Oct. 9, 1968.
October 9
NASA Apollo Mission Director William C. Schneider reported
completion of all action items pertinent to Apollo 7 assigned by Apollo Program
Director Samuel C. Phillips as a result of recommendations by the Apollo Crew
Safety Review Board on May 27, 1968. These actions had included qualification of
critical subsystems; a review of the AS-205 launch vehicle test history; a
review of Saturn IB 205 and CSM 101 functional interfaces; a manned test
readiness review, which was completed at KSC on August 28; and issuance of an
Emergency Actions Summary Document containing emergency and contingency
situations and appropriate procedures for pad operations, which had won approval
on September 27.
Memo, Schneider to Flight Readiness Review Secretariat for Apollo, "Crew
Safety Review Board Action," Oct. 9, 1968.
October 10
Because of the continuing problem of hardware changes, Apollo
Program Director Samuel C. Phillips revised policies and procedures for control
of changes for AS-503 and subsequent missions. Level II Configuration Control
Boards, said Phillips, would have authority to implement several categories of
engineering changes: mandatory changes to ensure crew safety or mission success,
changes that would substantially reduce workload or checkout time at KSC, and
changes to improve the probability of launch and to reduce the possibility of
launch delays or scrubs, based on engineering analysis and failure history.
Phillips admitted that other essential changes might be needed that did not
fulfil these criteria, but such "down-the-line" changes must be held to an
absolute minimum, he told ASPO Manager George M. Low. All changes that affected
deliveries or launch schedules, on the other hand, must still be submitted to
the Level I CCB for approval before implementation. These revised procedures,
Phillips believed, would produce the control of changes needed to ensure an
operationally suitable Apollo space vehicle, yet allow the secondary-level CCB
to exercise "tough and critical judgment" of the change decision process, to
allow needed flexibility within the overall program.
Ltr., Phillips to Low, "Change Policies and Procedures," Oct. 10, 1968.
October 11-22
Apollo 7 (AS-205), the first manned Apollo
flight, lifted off from Launch Complex 34 at Cape Kennedy Oct. 11, carrying
Walter M. Schirra, Jr., Donn F. Eisele, and R. Walter Cunningham. The countdown
had proceeded smoothly, with only a slight delay because of additional time
required to chill the hydrogen system in the S-IVB stage of the Saturn launch
vehicle. Liftoff came at 11:03 a.m. EDT. Shortly after insertion into orbit, the
S-IVB stage separated from the CSM, and Schirra and his crew performed a
simulated docking with the S-IVB stage, maneuvering to within 1.2 meters of the
rocket. Although spacecraft separation was normal, the crew reported that one
adapter panel had not fully deployed. Two burns using the reaction control
system separated the spacecraft and launch stage and set the stage for an
orbital rendezvous maneuver, which the crew made on the second day of the
flight, using the service propulsion engine.
Crew and spacecraft performed well throughout the mission. During eight burns
of the service propulsion system during the flight, the engine functioned
normally. October 14, third day of the mission, witnessed the first live
television broadcast from a manned American spacecraft. The SPS engine was used
to deorbit after 259 hours 39 minutes of flight. CM-SM separation and operation
of the earth landing system were normal, and the spacecraft splashed down about
13 kilometers from the recovery ship, the U.S.S. Essex, at 7:11
a.m. EDT October 22. Although the vehicle initially settled in an apex-down
("stable 2") attitude, upright bags functioned normally and returned the CSM to
an upright position in the water. Schirra, Eisele, and Cunningham were quickly
picked up by a recovery helicopter and were safe aboard the recovery vessel less
than an hour after splashdown.
All primary Apollo 7 mission objectives were met, as well as
every detailed test objective (and three test objectives not originally
planned). Engineering firsts from Apollo 7, aside from live
television from space, included drinking water for the crew produced as a
by-product of the fuel cells. Piloting and navigation accomplishments included
an optical rendezvous, daylight platform realignment, and orbital determination
via sextant tracking of another vehicle. All spacecraft systems performed
satisfactorily. Minor anomalies were countered by backup systems or changes in
procedures. With successful completion of the Apollo 7 mission,
which proved out the design of the Block II CSM (CSM 101), NASA and the nation
had taken the first step on the pathway to the moon.
TWX, William C. Schneider to distr., "Apollo 7 Mission, Mission Director's
24-Hour Report," Oct. 22, 1968; memos, George E. Mueller to Acting
Administrator, "Manned Space Flight Weekly Report - October 14, 1968," Oct. 14,
1968, and "Manned Space Flight Weekly Report - October 21, 1968," Oct. 21, 1968.
October 16
Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips ordered that the
Saturn IB program be placed in a standby status pending any future requirements
for Apollo or the Apollo Applications program. Phillips' action signaled the
shift in Apollo to the Saturn V vehicle, effective with AS-503.
TWX, Phillips to distr., "Saturn IB Program Planning," Oct. 16, 1968.
October 17
Dale D. Myers, Apollo CSM Manager at North American Rockwell,
wrote ASPO Manager George Low on the policy question of contractor and
subcontractor support of the current Apollo flight program and potential
follow-on activities. Support for such activities, Myers said, "can be seriously
jeopardized if we permit . . . experienced, specialized personnel and unique
facilities to become irretrievably lost to the program." He emphasized in
particular the case of Aeronca, Inc., of Middletown, Ohio, manufacturer of
stainless steel honeycomb panels that formed the structure of the CSM
heatshield. Without some sort of sustaining activity, manufacturing skills and
capabilities at Aeronca - and numerous other subcontractors and vendors - would
rapidly wither. Myers earnestly solicited Low's views on the subject of
subcontractor capability retention. In Low's response, he indicated that
immediate action was being initiated to establish capability retention for the
three most critical sources, Aeronca, Beech, and Pratt and Whitney, and a plan
of action was being prepared for others.
Ltrs., Myers to Low, Oct. 17, 1968; Low to Myers, Nov. 15, 1968.
October 17
Two NASA investigation boards had reported that loss of
attitude control caused the May 6 accident that destroyed lunar landing research
vehicle No. 1, NASA announced (see May 6 and May 16). Helium in propellant tanks
had been depleted earlier than normal, dropping pressure needed to force
hydrogen peroxide propellant to the attitude-control lift rockets and thrusters.
Warning to the pilot was too late for him to take necessary action for landing.
The boards called for improvements in LLRV and LLTV design and operating
practices and more stringent control over flying programs. No bad effects on the
Apollo lunar landing program had been found and no changes were recommended for
the LM.
NASA Release 68-182, "LLRV Accident Report," Oct. 17, 1968.
October 18
David B. Pendley, Technical Assistant for Flight Safety at
MSC, recommended to ASPO Manager George M. Low an official policy position for
landings on land. Pendley stated that despite all efforts by the Center's
Engineering and Development Directorate to develop a safe land-landing
capability with the CSM, the goal could not be attained. The best course, he
told Low, was to accept the risk inherent in the fact that a land landing could
not be avoided in an early launch abort-accept the risk openly and frankly and
to plan rescue operations on the premise of major structural damage to the
spacecraft. "If we do not officially recognize the land landing hazard," Pendley
said, "this will place us in an untenable position should an accident occur, and
will further prejudice the safety of the crew by continuing a false feeling of
security on the subject."
Memo, Pendley to Low, "Land landings," Oct. 18, 1968.
October 19
NASA Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips apprised
Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight George E. Mueller of recent
program decisions and planning for extravehicular activities (EVA) on the first
Apollo lunar landing mission. Primary objective on that first flight, Phillips
said, had from the inception of the program been a safe manned landing and
return. However, in light of current schedules, mission planning, and crew
training activities, the agency must now commit itself to a definite scope for
EVA activities on the first flight. After thorough review of the mission, a
tentative EVA outline had been drawn up at the end of August and distributed to
the Centers and Headquarters offices for comment. On September 11 the Manned
Space Flight Management Council reviewed the proposed EVA scheme and criticisms
and approved a formal EVA mission plan:
- The first mission would include a single EVA period of up to three hours.
Training experience and simulations would form the basis for a decision on
one- versus two-man EVAs during the period.
- The Apollo Lunar Surface Experiments Package and the Lunar Geology
Investigation experiment would not be carried aboard the flight. Lunar soil
samples would be collected. Also, other candidate experiments would be
considered for inclusion on the flight.
- Television would be carried aboard the flight, both for operational and
public information benefits.
- A paramount objective on the first landing would be to assess limitations
and capabilities of the astronauts and their equipment in the lunar surface
environment, to enhance the scientific return from the second and subsequent
missions. (MSC was to structure detailed test objectives and experiments to
satisfy this goal.)
- And MSC would recommend to Headquarters (including cost and schedule
impacts) hardware changes that would lengthen the EVA time available for
scientific investigations during subsequent flights.
Memo, Phillips to
Mueller, "Extravehicular Activities for the First Lunar Landing Mission," Oct.
19, 1968.
October 21
MSC Director Robert R. Gilruth formally constituted an
Operational Readiness Inspection Committee to inspect the Lunar Receiving
Laboratory to demonstrate its suitability to accomplish its mission. John D.
Hodge of MSC was appointed Chairman of the ORI and Peter J. Armitage, MSC,
Executive Secretary. Other members were Aleck C. Bond, John W. Conlon, D. O.
Coons, Joseph P. Kerwin, Paul H. Vavra, and Earle B. Young, all of MSC; E.
Barton Geer, LaRC; A. G. Wedum, Ft. Detrick, Md.; and Donald U. Wise, NASA Hq.
Memo, Gilruth to distr., "Operational Readiness Inspection of the Lunar
Receiving Laboratory," Oct. 21, 1968.
October 21
While the flight of Apollo 7 was still in
progress, ASPO Manager George M. Low ordered that CSM 101 be returned to Downey
as quickly as possible at the end of the mission to begin postflight testing as
quickly as possible. Therefore, no public affairs showing of the spacecraft
could be permitted.
Memo, Low to Kenneth S. Kleinknecht, "Spacecraft 101 postflight activities,"
Oct. 21, 1968.
October 21
Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight George E.
Mueller summarized launch preparations for the near-term missions Apollo 8 and
Apollo 9. Hurricane Gladys had interrupted work on the Apollo 8 spacecraft and
launch vehicle and work was now about two days behind schedule. (Because winds
from the storm did not exceed Apollo design values, however, Apollo 8 remained
at Pad A and was not returned to the assembly building.) Checkout of LM-3 and
CSM 104 for Apollo 9 were on schedule. The CSM had been stacked and would
undergo combined systems tests shortly. Ascent and descent stages of the lander
would be joined immediately after docking tests had been completed.
Memo, Mueller to Acting Administrator, "Manned Space Flight Weekly Report -
October 21, 1968," Oct. 21, 1968.
